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Editor’s Note
Volume 7 of Space & Defense marks a
broadening of our editorial interest. We still
aspire to be the premier journal for innovative
ideas about military, civil, or commercial
space that compel us to rethink defense of the
nation. Research in this rapidly evolving
policy area celebrates the Air Force’s vital
contributions to space studies dating back to
the service’s inception sixty-six years ago.
Yet, our heritage at the Eisenhower Center for
Space and Defense Studies, U.S. Air Force
Academy touches a wider range of concerns.
It was, after all, USAFA’s Department of
Political Science, the parent department of
this Center, which in 1965 first conceived and
published a graduate level textbook on
American Defense Policy (ADP).
President Eisenhower, from whom the Center
takes much inspiration, was a founding father
of both the Air Force Academy and the U.S.
Space Program. A most interesting aspect of
his rich legacy as Commander-in-Chief,
including his famous Farewell Address, was
his clarion call for the nation to think through
its defense in a transformed world. The
appeal of Soviet ideology in recovering
Europe and post-colonial states, combined
with the advent of nuclear fusion bombs and
ballistic missiles, changed dramatically the
old calculus of national security.
Eisenhower’s administration picked up a
wartime cue laid down by the former Office
of Scientific Research and Development
under President Roosevelt and reached out
before the next hot war, sponsoring research
at influential 1950s think tanks like RAND
and at leading universities—not only for
technology development but new knowledge
in the social sciences, including economics
and politics.
Certainly, professors and researchers could
not simply deliver all the right policy

solutions to end the Cold War, but the
intellectual effort, particularly during the late1950s and early-1960s, transformed both the
discipline of Political Science and the practice
of policy making in positive ways, which in
turn helped America meet novel defense
challenges. The inkling that we may be
entering another transformative period
marked by globalized economic structures
and security threats—this time with American
values faltering abroad, despite, or perhaps in
part because of, the lack of a recognizable
superpower rival—prompted us several years
ago to create the Center and launch this
research journal on Space & Defense.
Of course, our home military service and our
main patron, the U.S. Air Force, remains
intensely interested in the future of space. We
suspect that welcoming researchers from
academia, government, and industry who
share this interest and would take it as a novel
vantage point from which to pursue broader
questions of national defense in a world
transformed—questions upending the old
security calculus—will before long advance
our original discussion on space.
Twenty-first century domains such as space,
cyber, and violent non-state networks remain
distinct from one another, but the logics of
dealing with them are connected in subtle
ways, which we believe will become more
intriguing and useful as we explore. For
example, because globalization shapes
today’s security priorities, several
contemporary national defense concerns force
us to consider tensions between transnational
cooperation and inter-state competition;
among civil, commercial, and military
activities; and between traditional versus
bounded or pooled sovereignty. We note how
certain Cold War concepts such as deterrence
frequently appear in these pages as they apply

to space; elsewhere deterrence has come up
for cyber and again for terrorism. All these
burgeoning literatures benefit from
intellectual bedrock created during the
Eisenhower era, but they have not, as yet,
learned much from one another. This is
where our journal can make a difference,
cultivating some articles without space in the
title that nevertheless help us think about new
domains for strategic competition or security
cooperation and, by the same token, articles
with space in the title that urge us to
contemplate arenas beyond space where
defense policy makers face political,
economic, organizational, and technological
dilemmas in the new world opening before
them.
This issue of Space & Defense, the first with
our new editorial direction in mind, offers
three peer-reviewed features, along with a
special report from the Eisenhower Center
and another installment of Publisher’s Corner.
In the lead article, SAIC (Science
Applications International Corporation)
analysts Justin Anderson, Walt Conrad, and
Sarah Jacobs Gamberini respond to the
globalization Zeitgeist in current space policy.
They follow their previously published article
on proposals from China, Russia, and Europe
to prohibit weaponization of space with a
fresh evaluation of arms control prospects
involving emerging space powers,
emphasizing potential contributions from
India, Brazil, and South Africa. Jonty KaskuJackson of the National Security Space
Institute in Colorado Springs widens the arc
of cooperation from multilateral agreements
to transnational legal codes. She explores the
value of international liability law, presently
observed by civil and commercial satellite
operators, for supplementing national
deterrence polices against attacks on space
assets, including military satellites. Our final
feature, from Adam Lowther of the Air Force
Research Institute and Casey Lucius of the

Naval War College, serves as a point of
departure, a marker for the limits on
cooperation in space once the United States
has settled, concretely and explicitly, upon its
vital interests. This issue concludes with two
products from the Eisenhower Center. The
first is a special report, which was
commissioned last year by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) in order to help
the Department think through future policy
dilemmas of Space Verification. The last
item is our eagerly anticipated “Publisher’s
Corner.” Former diplomat and founding
director of the Eisenhower Center,
Ambassador Roger Harrison, reflects on why
discourse—specifically, how the policy
machinery chooses to name a new national
security domain such as “cyberspace”—
matters so much when allies and adversaries
alike sense the world transforming under their
watch.

Damon Coletta
Schuyler (Sky) Foerster
USAFA, January 2014

Article

International Space Negotiations, Emerging Space Powers, and U.S.
Efforts to Protect the Military Use of Space
Justin Anderson, Ph.D., Walt Conrad, Ph.D., and Ms. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini
In recent years strategists and diplomats
from space faring nations have engaged in debates
with their foreign counterparts (and in some cases,
with each other) on a range of issues related to
norms and laws – or the relative lack thereof –
applicable to the military use of space. 1 Questions
have run the gamut from the very broad (should
the slim volume of outer space law relevant to
military platforms and operations be expanded?)
to the very specific (what new technical tools are
available for the verification regime of a notional
future space arms control agreement?).
As a major space power and a country that relies
on the safe and secure use of space for a broad
range of vital military functions both on the
ground and across the “high frontier,” the process
and outcome of these debates are critically
important to the United States. In the post-Cold
War era, U.S. policymakers and space experts
have differed over what role the United States
should play within these deliberations. Should it
take the lead in proposing new measures? Or
should it generally oppose any changes or
additions, viewing them as possible constraints?
The Obama administration has strongly supported
the former, contending that U.S. leadership is vital
to developing multilateral agreements and
arrangements designed to mitigate an increasingly
“congested, contested, and competitive” (often
referred to as the “3 C’s”) space environment. 2

The administration has also articulated a clear
litmus test for U.S. approval of any international
proposal addressing the state use of space, to
include draft space security or arms control
agreements – they must be “equitable, effectively
verifiable, and enhance the national security of the
United States and its allies.” 3
During 2013 a number of proposals intended to
address the challenge posed by the 3 C’s, and
suggesting various transparency measures or other
mechanisms relevant to the military use of space,
came up for discussion between major space
powers or debate within international forums.
These include a draft International Code of
Conduct currently under development by the
European Union (EU), United States, and other
states and a number of recommendations issued
within the July 2013 final report by the UN Group
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency
and Confidence Building Measures in Outer
Space. 4
As a major space faring nation and leading
military space power, U.S. support for these and
other initiatives proposing norms, rules, or laws
relevant to the military use of space will play a
significant role within the decision-making
processes of other space actors weighing a
decision to endorse or oppose these measures. At
the same time, however, the support of the United
States and its allies alone cannot necessarily

1

All three authors are employees at Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The
views in this article are those of the authors and do not
reflect the views of SAIC or any of its U.S.
Government clients.
2
In March 2012 testimony before Congress,
Ambassador Greg Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Space Policy, noted “We are taking a
leading role in international efforts to promote
responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space …. A more
cooperative, predictable environment enhances U.S.
national security and discourages destabilizing crisis
behavior. We are supporting development of data

standards, best practices, transparency and confidencebuilding measures, and norms of behavior for
responsible space operations[.]” House Armed
Services Committee, Ambassador Greg Schulte,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy, Statement, March 8, 2012: 5.
3
White House, National Space Policy of the United
States of America, June 28, 2010: 7.
4
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the
Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space
Activities (A/68/189), July 29, 2013.
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guarantee the success of any proposed multilateral
space initiative or agreement. Emerging space
powers are increasingly making their voices heard
on space issues, and represent important potential
partners in future coalitions assembled to counter
the 3 C’s. The 15-member GGE, for example,
includes representatives from states such as Brazil,
South Africa, Chile, Romania, and Nigeria.
In the sections below, we consider the space
programs, objectives, and views on international
space law, military use of space, and space arms
control held by three emerging space powers:
India, Brazil, and South Africa. They represent
three different points on the spectrum of emerging
space powers, to include a state aspiring to join
the first rank of space powers (India), a state with
an ambitious space agenda balancing domestic
programs and significant bilateral assistance from
a major space power (Brazil), and a state that has
chosen to focus its relatively limited resources on
key niche capabilities (South Africa). The
varying space policies, capabilities, and ambitions
of these three states provide a good sample of the
diverse programs and perspectives on space found
across the population of emerging space powers. 5
The views of these states, and other space-faring
nations outside of the traditional space powers, are
increasingly important to international debates on
outer space, and their support – or lack thereof –
for future U.S. or international proposals on the
use of space may make or break multilateral
efforts to address the 3 C’s and other key issues
related to the military use of space.

INDIA
Civilian and Military Space Programs
India is an increasingly important
geopolitical player that is determined to attain
recognition as a great power. Past and present
Indian government leaders, while varying in their
politics, have unanimously agreed that
advancements in science and technology are
critical to the future development and security of
their state. The country established a Department
of Space in 1972 and has long linked its national
space program with the realization of broader
national goals; its stated determination to achieve
“self-reliance in Space Technology,” for example,
is an ambition with important implications for the
country’s future economic and defense planning. 6
Eager to explore space, capture a share of the
growing international space market, and project
power across and beyond South Asia – and wary
of the economic growth and military space
developments of China – India is devoting
significant resources to civilian and military space
projects. The country currently has one of the
world’s largest space budgets (by one estimate,
the sixth largest in 2010-11). 7 The Department of
Space’s research arm, for example, announced a
67 billion rupee (US $1.3 billion) budget for the
2012-13 fiscal year. 8
Within the current community of space-faring
nations, India is one of the few states outside of
the major space powers to develop its own launch
vehicle. Its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
(PSLV), first launched in 1993, is the country’s
6

5

Emerging space powers are defined here as spacefaring nations outside of the major space powers
(United States, Russian Federation, China, and the
European Union). Different data sets provide varying
answers regarding the current number of space-faring
nations, reflecting a lack of consensus on the definition
of a “space-faring” state. The number of states
participating in UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), however, provides a good
indicator of the number of states claiming space
equities. At present, UNCOPUOS has 74 members.

Government of India, Department of Space, Outcome
Budget 2011-2012, n.d.: 1.
7
Ajey Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?
(New Delhi: Springer India, 2013): 60; Deloitte,
Overview of Indian Space Sector 2010, n.d.: 6.
http://www.deloitte.com.br/publicacoes/2007/A&D_O
verview_Indian_Space_Sector2010.pdf (accessed April
24, 2013).
8
The Roscosmos budget for 2013, as a comparison, is
$5.6 billion USD. “India Steps Up Space Program
with Big Budget, Bigger Satellites and a Leap to
Mars,” RT.com, September 30, 2012,
http://rt.com/news/india-space-satellite-budget-331/
(accessed April 24, 2013).
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major space launch platform and has enjoyed a
string of 18 successful launches since its last
failure. 9 With an official payload capacity
allowing it to place “1,600 kg satellites in 620 km
sun-synchronous polar orbit and 1,050 kg satellite
in geo-synchronous transfer orbit,” it has carried
both Indian and foreign satellites into space.10
The country has also developed a
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle
(GSLV) capable of launching larger payloads (up
to 2.5 tons) into geosynchronous orbit. This
platform, however, has a mixed record. The
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) lists
five successes and three failures from the GSLV’s
eight launches; expert commentators view the
number of full or partial failures as higher.11 India
is also developing a larger GSLV Mark III
designed to place 4-ton payloads into space. 12
In addition, India is devoting significant resources
to space exploration programs. The country
launched a robotic Mars probe (15 kg payload) in
November 2013 that is scheduled to reach the
planet in late 2014. 13 The Indian Air Force has
9

Stephen Clark, “India Launches Surveillance Satellite
in ‘Grand Success’,” Space.com, April 26, 2012,
http://www.space.com/15440-india-rocket-launchsurveillance-satellite.html (accessed April 24, 2013).
10
Government of India, Department of Space, “Launch
Vehicles,” n.d. http://dos.gov.in/launchvehicles.aspx
(accessed April 24, 2013); William Graham, “Indian
PSLV Successfully Lofts Multiple Satellites,”
NASASpaceflight.com, February 25, 2013,
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/02/pslv-launchmulti-sats/ (accessed April 24, 2013).
11
Lt Col James Mackey, USAF, “Recent US and
Chinese Antisatellite Activities,” Air and Space Power
Journal (Fall 2009),
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/f
al09/mackey.html (accessed April 24, 2013); Indian
Space Research Organisation, “GSLV,” n.d.
http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/GSLV/gslv.aspx
(accessed April 24, 2013); Graham, “Indian PSLV.”
12
Indian Space Research Organisation, “GSLV Mark
III,” n.d.
http://www.isro.org/Launchvehicles/GSLVMARKIII/
mark3.aspx (accessed April 23, 2013).
13
PTI, “Budget 2012: ISRO Gets Rs 125 cr for Mars
Mission, Eyes Nov 2013 Launch,” March 16, 2012,
http://www.dnaindia.com/scitech/report_budget-2012isro-gets-rs125-cr-for-mars-mission-eyes-nov-2013launch_1663315 (accessed April 23, 2012);
Snuderarajan P., “India to Launch Mars Mission Next

8

also started recruiting candidates from its ranks
for future manned space flights. 14 Furthermore,
India is determined to compete with major players
in the increasingly lucrative commercial space
launch market and has successfully launched
twenty-nine commercial satellites into outer
space. 15
India has also devoted significant resources to
developing remote-sensing satellites designed to
address pressing national needs, such as close
monitoring of factors affecting crop yields and
providing a range of data assisting disaster
management response. 16 The ISRO proudly touts
its current constellation of eleven satellites as the
largest of its kind in the world. 17 While the bulk
Year,” The Hindu, March 16, 2012,
http://www.thehindu.com/scitech/technology/article3003109.ece (accessed April 23,
2013).
14
“IAF Developing Parameters for India’s Manned
Space Mission,” The Economic Times, December 28,
2012,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-1228/news/36036517_1_manned-mission-selectionprocess-iaf (accessed May 2, 2013).
15
India launched its first commercial satellite (the
Italian AGILE satellite) in 2007. Frank O’Donnell,
“India’s Space Ascent Gains New Boost,” Geopolitical
Monitor, May 11, 2011,
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/indias-spaceascent-gains-new-boost-4363 (accessed April 23, 2013)
and Radhakrishna Rao, “The Indian Space Programme
in 2012: A Review,” IDSA Comment, Institute for
Defence Studies and Analysis, January 2, 2013,
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheIndianSpaceProg
rammein2012_rrao_020113 (accessed April 23, 2012).
See also the promotional brochure produced by the
ISRO for the PSLV: Indian Space Research
Organization, “PSLV-C21: 100th Indian Space
Mission” (Bangalore, n.d.), http://www.isro.org/pslvc21/pdf/pslv-c21-brochure.pdf (accessed April 23,
2013).
16
For a detailed official Indian government briefing on
the system, see Deviprasad Karnik, “Indian Remote
Sensing Satellites,” presentation, Civil Commercial
Imagery Evaluation Workshop, Fairfax, Virginia,
March 17, 2010,
http://calval.cr.usgs.gov/JACIE_files/JACIE10/Present
ations/WedAM/Karnik_Deviprasad_JACIE2010FINA
L.pdf.
17
ISRO, “Earth Observation Satellites,” n.d.,
http://www.isro.org/satellites/earthobservationsatellites
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of India’s space remote sensing resources are
devoted to civilian uses, the 1998 Kargil conflict - fought to reclaim positions in high mountain
areas covertly occupied by Pakistani troops -- led
India’s military to request improved space
surveillance capabilities. The ISRO subsequently
developed low-earth orbit satellites expressly
designed for military use, to include imagery data
on Pakistan’s military forces and movements
(with a focus on its ballistic missile arsenal).18
India’s civilian space programs reflect its
determination to establish itself as a first-order
space power that can match the space launch,
space exploration, and manned and unmanned
programs (both legacy and under development) of
the United States, EU, Russia, and China. While
India faces a number of challenges in advancing
major programs (such as the GSLV), and its use
of major fiscal, scientific, and technical resources
on space programs has faced a number of
domestic and international critics, it is a leading
member of the emerging space powers. 19
India has also started to consider whether to
compete with major space powers by developing a
military space program. China’s successful 2007
test of a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapon prompted Indian military leaders to call
for the country’s armed forces to develop both
space officers and a range of space capabilities.
At present, the military has a “small Integrated
Space Cell” that may form the nucleus of a future
“Indian Military Space Command,” possibly
reflecting a degree of wariness by Indian political
leaders – and opposition from its well-established

civilian space program – to standing up a major,
new, military space entity. 20
The country has made significant progress,
however, in regard to space systems with either
military or dual civil-military applications. India
has successfully developed and launched RISAT1, an earth imaging satellite with monitoring
capabilities that serve both civilian and national
defense needs. 21 The country is also planning to
build its own national equivalent to the Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation,
recognizing the importance of these dual-use
systems to the U.S. military and reluctant to rely
on a foreign power for an important defense
capability. 22
The most important military space development
catalyzed by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test,
however, was the decision by India’s Defense
Research Development Organisation (DRDO) to
state that it was prepared to rapidly construct and
deploy, if needed, an ASAT to match Beijing’s.
V.K. Saraswat, head of DRDO, has repeatedly
stated that India already possesses the “building
blocks” of an ASAT system due to earlier or
ongoing work on rocket, missile guidance, and
missile defense systems developed for other
national security programs. 23
Indian government officials and non-government
analysts discussing the need for an indigenous
ASAT program cite the development of ASAT
systems by Russia, the United States, and China
as key factors driving New Delhi’s pursuit of this
type of capability. 24 Former Indian Air Force
20

.aspx (accessed November 27, 2013).
http://calval.cr.usgs.gov/JACIE_files/JACIE10/Present
ations/WedAM/Karnik_Deviprasad_JACIE2010FINA
L.pdf (accessed November 27, 2013).
18
Gautum Sen, ed. Conceptualizing Security for India
in the 21st Century (Atlantic: New Delhi, 2007): 146.
19
Palash Ghosh, “Red Planet Blues: India to Launch
Mars Space Mission but some Question Priorities,”
International Business Times, February 22, 2013,
http://www.ibtimes.com/red-planet-blues-india-launchmars-space-mission-october-some-question-priorities1101142# (accessed May 2, 2013).

Craig Covault, “India Races China in Space for
Asian Prestige, Military Security,” Spaceref.com,
December 13, 2012, http://spaceref.com/asia/indiaraces-china-in-space-for-asian-prestige-militarysecurity.html (accessed April 23, 2013).
21
Rao, “The Indian Space Programme in 2012.”
22
Ibid.
23
T.S. Subramanian and Y. Mallikarjun, “Capability to
Neutralise Enemy Satellites Proved,” The Hindu,
March 7, 2011,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/capability-toneutralise-enemy-satellites-proved/article1515159.ece
(accessed April 23, 2013).
24
Both Russia and the United States, however, retired
their ASAT programs before the end of the Cold War.
Victoria Samson, “India and Space Security,” The
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Chief P.V. Naik stated in a January 2010 address
that India’s increasing reliance on satellites made
these assets potential targets in future conflicts.
Without expressly mentioning China, Naik stated,
“Our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon
systems because our neighborhood possesses one,”
and advocated the development of Indian ASAT
capabilities. 25 Naik and other Indian strategic
thinkers, recognizing the inherent difficulty of
developing means to shield fragile satellites from
attacks, argue that an offensive ASAT weapon
offers the best deterrent – and only defense – for
the country’s civilian and military assets in outer
space. Saraswat, for example, has stated that
India remains firmly committed to a policy of not
threatening to “attack anyone in space,” but given
the threat of foreign ASAT programs, “we have
all the technology elements required to integrate a
system through which we can defend our satellites
or take care of future requirements.” 26

Space Review, May 9, 2011,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1838/1
(accessed April 23, 2013); Bharath Gopalaswamy and
Gaurav Kampani, “Piggybacking Anti-Satellite
Technologies on Missile Defense,” Carnegie
Proliferation Analysis, April 19, 2011,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/19/piggybackin
g-anti-satellite-technologies-on-ballistic-missiledefense-india-s-hedge-and-demonstrateapproach/3l6#3 (accessed April 23, 2013); A.
Adityanjee, “Pining for PAROS or Parity?,” C3S Paper
# 111, http://www.c3sindia.org/us/193 (accessed April
23, 2013).
25
Bhargavi Kerur, “Air Chief Marshal PV Naik wants
Missiles to Destroy Enemy Satellites,” January 23,
2010, DNAIndia,
http://www.dnaindia.com/bangalore/report_ir-chiefmarshal-pv-naik-wants-missiles-to-destroy-enemysatellites_1338174 (accessed April 23, 2013).
26
Indrani Bagchi, “India Working on Tech to Defend
Satellites,” Times of India, March 6, 2011,
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-0306/india/28659986_1_missile-defence-asat-test-spacesystems (accessed April 23, 2013); “India has
Technology to Defend Satellites,” The Economic
Times, February 11, 2011,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-0211/news/28540512_1_cruise-missile-agni-v-satellites;
Siddharth Srivastava, “India Hones its Missile Shield,”
Asia Times, April 16, 2011,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MD16Df01
.html (accessed April 23, 2013).

10

There is limited public information available,
however, about the technical specifications of an
Indian ASAT system or the strategy or operations
concepts that would guide its use. Saraswat has
described Indian research and development of an
ASAT system as embedded within broader efforts
to design, test, and field a range of ballistic
missile defense systems. In April 2012, Saraswat
described an Indian ASAT’s “kill vehicle” as
travelling aboard an Agni-V ballistic missile and
using “advanced seekers … to home in to the
target satellite.” 27 These details indicate the
DRDO is opting for a ground-based, rather than a
space-based, ASAT. India likely views a groundbased offensive weapon as providing a means to
respond to potential attacks on its satellites
without “weaponizing” outer space. Saraswat, for
example, has explained that India is not planning
to develop “offensive space capabilities.”28 The
DRDO has also stated it has no future plans to test
an Indian ASAT in space and will rely on a series
of ground-based tests and simulations to test
system components. 29
In the absence of testing, and with the DRDO
implying it would construct an ASAT using
technology and systems designed for other
purposes, skeptics have suggested India may have
underestimated the difficulty of constructing and
employing an anti-satellite kill vehicle.30
Nevertheless, India’s stated interest in an ASAT
reflects its interest in catching up with the
sophisticated military space capabilities fielded by
27
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2012,
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April 23, 2012).
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30
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Review, March 28, 2011,
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major powers. India may soon conclude that a
military space program – to include a command
structure, specially trained personnel, and
purpose-built capabilities – is both an additional
requirement of membership within the top tier of
space powers and necessary to protect and deter
attacks on valuable satellites in an increasingly
hostile space environment.

space. Ambassador Mehta suggested that
ensuring space remains a peaceful environment
will require space-faring nations to negotiate a
legally binding treaty addressing state use of outer
space. This process, however, could be
“complemented” by the negotiation and
implementation of a series of politically binding
transparency and confidence-building measures
(TCBMs).

Views on Proposed Space Agreements, Military
Use of Space, and Space Arms Control
Within international negotiating forums,
Indian officials stress the importance of ensuring
outer space remains free and open to all states 31
and emphasize the vital role that current
international treaties and international law
(including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST))
play in safeguarding space as a global commons. 32
Speaking to the UN Conference on Disarmament
(CD) in May and June 2012, Indian Ambassador
Sujata Mehta called on the international
community to take steps to protect the sovereign
right of all states to access outer space.33 She also
stated that India opposes the “weaponisation” of
31

“We believe that it is essential to preserve and
promote the benefits flowing from advances in space
technology by ensuring access to and use of space.”
Ambassador Sujata Mehta, Permanent Representative
of India to the Conference on Disarmament, UN
Conference on Disarmament Plenary statement, May
15, 2012,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)
/6543A9D189C14E93C12579FF0035EF29/$file/1257
_India.pdf (accessed April 22, 2013).
32
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well respected.” R.G. Nadadur, statement, UN
COPOUS Legal Subcommittee 768th Meeting, April 1,
2008, COPOUS/LEGAL/T.768: 3.
33
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India is against the weaponization of
space … it is essential to preserve and
promote the benefits flowing from
advances in space technology [by
preserving free access to space]. This
would require a step-by-step approach
wherein legal measures are complemented
with TCBMs that are non-discriminatory
and evolved through an inclusive process
with the participation of all space faring
nations. 34
Indian diplomats and space officials also express
concerns regarding the increasing amount of
debris in outer space. While stating that
international cooperation is necessary to address
the problem, they also assert that states most
responsible for generating space debris should
take the lion’s share of the responsibility for
cleaning it up. 35
Within UN bodies, India has provided general
support to measures opposing the “weaponization”
of space, regularly voting in favor of “Prevention
of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS)
resolutions in the General Assembly. 36 It has also
stated that it supports “consideration” of these
resolutions within the CD. It has stopped short,
34

Ambassador Sujata Mehta, UN CD Plenary
statement, May 15, 2012.
35
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36
For many years, PAROS resolutions were regularly
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United States never supported these resolutions and
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recent discussions in the General Assembly and other
UN bodies on preventing the “weaponization” of outer
space have shifted attention to the Russian-Chinese
PPWT or other proposals.
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however, of endorsing the Russian-Chinese Treaty
on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in
Outer Space (PPWT) draft accord, which these
two countries view as rooted within the PAROS
resolutions. 37 In addition, the Indian government
has not taken an official position for or against the
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities (ICoC), the multilateral successor to
earlier attempts by the European Union to develop
a space Code of Conduct. In a March 2013
statement to the CD, India said it was working
with the EU and other parties on new space
TCBMs, while also reiterating its view that states
should negotiate a new, legally binding treaty to
address concerns about the possible future
placement of weapons in space. 38
A number of Indian press and think-tank reports
in 2011, however, stated that New Delhi was
unhappy with its lack of engagement in the EU
CoC drafting process and objected to several key
tenets of the proposed code. 39 For example, in a
series of articles in foreign publications (including
Strategic Studies Quarterly) and presentations to
international audiences in 2012, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., of the Observer Research
Foundation, a New Delhi think-tank, argued the
EU fundamentally erred in failing to directly
involve India and other non-European states in
developing the text of the draft Code of
37
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38
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39
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Conduct. 40 In her assessment, the document
broadly failed to address the concerns of India,
other emerging space powers in Asia, or
developing states struggling to gain access to
space. She also criticized the draft code’s lack of
enforcement mechanisms and argued that its
request that states share information on national
space policies and space defense strategies was
wholly unrealistic – noting, for example, that this
latter provision was flatly rejected by China. 41
Other Indian commentators agreed with
Rajagopalan, stating the EU should have
consulted India in drafting the Code of Conduct
and accusing the organization of taking a
Western-centric approach to outer space that, if
implemented, would restrict the ability of India
and developing states to use space.42 However,
with the Code representing a voluntary,
politically-binding agreement, these criticisms
likely reflected a general concern that major space
powers might overlook (or deliberately ignore)
India’s views on space rather than specific
objections to provisions in its text. In response to
these and other critiques that it did not include
enough states in its earlier dialogues on the EU
40
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April 23, 2012).
41
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Analysis, May 6, 2011,
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CoC, the EU invited other space-faring nations,
including India, to actively participate in the
International Code of Conduct multilateral
discussions.
In official statements, however, Indian diplomatic
representatives have offered little detail regarding
the standards or mechanisms it would include
within a new space arms control or space use
treaty. Rather than put forward its own initiatives
on space, India may prefer to have key spacefaring nations solicit its opinion and court its vote
on future multilateral accords. As a country that
continues to achieve important milestones with its
national space program and is not afraid to openly
discuss the development of a deterrent capability
that can match or exceed the capabilities fielded
by other space-faring nations, New Delhi may
calculate it can afford to take a wait-and-see
approach to ongoing discussions and debates
between the traditional space powers on matters
such as the military use of space. Projecting
confidence in its ability to develop and defend
space assets necessary for 21st century national
security needs, but cautious and cagey with regard
to the military space programs of other states, it is
likely to support future multilateral space TCBM
agreements – so long as the major space-faring
states agree to fully participate.
BRAZIL
Civilian and Military Space Programs
From the 1960s to the present day,
Brazilian leaders have viewed the development of
a national space program as an important part of
broader efforts to solidify its status as a major
geopolitical and economic power. Its current
space program, however, embodies the significant
challenges faced by many emerging space powers
in attempting to develop a scientific, technical,
and industrial base capable of designing, testing,
and building space launch vehicles and satellites,
and sustaining the infrastructure necessary to
support and control them.

Today, however, it remains heavily reliant on
foreign states for key space capabilities such as
launch vehicles. Its dreams of breaking into the
first ranks of space powers will require the
country to make significant progress in improving
its national space capabilities in the near future or
risk falling behind other emerging space powers.
In the words of Jose Raimundo Braga Coelho,
president of Agencia Espacial Brasilieira (AEB),
Brazil’s national space agency: “[T]he truth is, in
terms of space, we need to take a leap. A
qualitative leap. A transforming leap. And with
all possible haste.” 43
Brazil’s views on space and security are rooted in
the belief that its national defense, economic, and
space goals are closely intertwined. For example,
the country has a large, diverse geography that
includes extensive areas, such as the Amazon
rainforest, that are difficult to monitor or traverse
from the ground. This complicates efforts by
Brazil’s military and security forces to protect its
borders and, in turn, its extensive and highly
valuable natural resources.
This places a premium on national development
of space platforms capable of performing data and
imagery monitoring and reporting functions.
Brazil does not at present have any dedicated
military assets in outer space, but the development
of a Geostationary Defense and Strategic
Communications Satellite (SGDC), a system
designed to provide the country with its first space
platform for secure communications, is a current
priority for the country’s national space
program. 44 The SGDC represents a critical
capability for realizing a number of goals
contained within National Strategy of Defense,
Brazil’s most recent (December 2008) national
defense guidance document. The National
Strategy discusses space as one of three “strategic
sectors” (in addition to cyber and nuclear) that are
critical to the country’s national security. 45 It
advocates for the development of a range of
monitoring technologies, to include satellites in
43

In the past, Brazil has realized important
achievements in space – a Brazilian astronaut, for
example, has served as part of the multinational
crew manning the International Space Station.
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space, that do not rely on foreign assistance,
arguing that the country can never view jointly
developed capabilities as fully secure.46 Brazil’s
military also hopes the SGDC will improve its
command-and-control capabilities, facilitate
future joint operations, and boost the ability of its
forces to monitor and defend the country’s land
borders, airspace, and waterways. 47
Brazil’s views on the relationship between space
and economic development also reflect the
government’s determination to leverage the
country’s existing economic strengths and
diversify its goods and services to address the
demands of a high-technology 21st century
marketplace. Brazil, for example, is a major
producer and exporter of agricultural products.
Information provided by, and communications
supported by, space assets are vital to protecting
this critical part of the country’s economy and the
country’s population from natural disasters.48 As
summarized by Marco Antonio Chapman, an
administrator at Brazil’s National Institute for
Space Research, Brazil’s space policy is aimed at
“mastering space technology to solve major
national problems …When we look at global
warming, pollution, [and] deforestation, we see
that there are a number of important issues that
have direct impact on Brazilian society.” 49
In addition, Brazil views its space program – and
associated science and technical programs – as
critical to diversifying its economy and equipping
its population for success in the Information Age.
It wants to become a provider of high-technology
products (to include those related to space) and
grant its entrepreneurs access to communications

and information services allowing them to
successfully navigate the global information
economy. Brasilia has concluded that the
infrastructure of a domestic space industry (e.g.,
launch facility, satellite control center,
communication links) and the platforms required
for cell phones, broadband services, and other
important contemporary tools of communication
and business all point to the need for a robust
national space program. 50
Brazil’s conviction that the realization of
important national security and economic goals
requires space systems underlines the importance
of satellites such as the SGDC that, by providing
secure communications to the country’s
government, is viewed as critical to a number of
important state civil and military functions. Brazil
believes its “national strategy of defense is
inseparable from [our] national strategy of
development” and views a truly independent
national space program as important to both
defending its national sovereignty and realizing
future economic growth.
While Brasilia envisions a future where the
country is a self-sufficient space power marketing
a broad range of space goods and services to an
international market, many observers believe it is
not close to becoming a fully sufficient space
power. 51 The country experienced early success
in building its Sonda series of sounding rockets,
with successful launches of Sonda I in 1967 and
Sonda II in 1969. 52 In 1979, the country
announced its ambitions to become a first-tier
space power, unveiling plans to develop its own
50
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satellites, launch vehicles, and spaceport.53
Recognizing the value of constructing the
spaceport near the equator, the country began
construction of its Alcantara Launch Center in
1982 and hosted a successful Sonda-2 launch in
1990. 54
A series of setbacks for its domestic rocket
programs, however, followed this initial progress.
Brazil’s efforts to construct a larger rocket – titled
the Veículo Lançador de Satélites [Satellite
Launch Vehicle] (VLS) – resulted in three failures,
in 1997, 1999, and 2003, with the third exploding
on its launch pad and causing the deaths of 21
technicians. 55 The accident highlighted a number
of problems with the country’s efforts to develop
space capabilities, including general problems
with funding (which came in fits and starts from
Brasilia) and tensions between civilian and
military elements of the country’s space
program. 56 The accident led to efforts to better
synchronize Brazil’s scientific, military, and
industry players involved in space matters and
confirmed a process, already underway, of
53
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consolidating most of Brazil’s space activities
under the civilian control of the Agência Espacial
Brasileira (AEB).
The failures forced Brazil to shelve plans to send
satellites into space aboard Brazilian launch
vehicles and accelerated efforts to seek foreign
partnerships in building a range of rockets and
satellites. 57 This led Brazil to forge a close
relationship on space matters with China. The
two countries first signed a bilateral space
cooperation agreement in 1988 and worked
closely together on developing the China-Brazil
Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS) satellite series,
described by AEB as “medium resolution remote
sensing satellites” with “agribusiness,
environment (and) defense” applications.58 This
ongoing collaboration between Brazil’s National
Institute for Space Research (the country’s lead
civilian space research body), AEB, the Chinese
Academy for Space Technology, and the China
National Space Administration has produced three
satellites: CBERS-1 in 1999, CBERS-2 in 2003,
and CBERS-2B in 2007. All three were launched
into space aboard Chinese rockets; while the most
recent launch (December 2013) failed, additional
launches are planned for 2014. 59
Significantly, CBERS-1 was the first imaging
satellite put into orbit by both countries that did
not rely on technology or assistance from other
space powers, reflecting the importance both
capitals placed in this collaborative effort (and the
state of technological advancement of their
respective programs in 1999). 60 In addition, both
states have viewed the CBERS satellites as
platforms for international diplomacy, voluntarily
57
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making images taken by CBERS-2B publicly
available online to developing nations. In doing
so, the two countries state that nations in Africa
and around the world that currently lack their own
satellites can freely use this data for disaster
planning, agriculture, and other purposes. 61
Brazil has also established separate partnerships
with Ukraine and Russia in order to develop space
launch vehicles. 62 Brazil and Ukraine are
developing a three-stage liquid-fueled rocket,
based on the latter’s proven Cyclone rocket series,
designed to place 1,600 kg payloads in
geostationary orbit. 63 Although the project has
experienced a number of delays, the first launch
from Alcantara is planned for late 2014.64 The
Brazilian-Russian project is focused on helping
the troubled VLS program by using technology
from Russia’s Angara rocket series, although this
collaboration – initially featuring five types of
launch vehicles – is now restricted to two rockets

61
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(VLS-Alpha and VLS-Beta), possibly due to
budget concerns. 65
Brazil’s civilian space program thus has close ties
with China’s space program and working
relationships with Ukraine and Russia. Its
relationship with the United States on space
matters has proven more complex due to U.S.
efforts to protect American space technology and
halt the proliferation of ballistic missiles, efforts
that extend to include a range of dual-use goods,
services, and relevant scientific and technical
knowledge. 66 In the past, these efforts have
represented a source of friction between the two
countries. In 2000, for example, a number of
Brazilian politicians objected to the U.S.
government’s insistence Brazil sign a space
Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) as a
precursor to cooperation between their respective
space programs, strongly criticizing Brasilia for
initially accepting this request. During the
subsequent ratification debate within Brazil’s
Congress, opponents of the agreement charged the
executive branch with “essentially ceding part of
Brazil's national territory to be used as a restricted
American base of operations.” 67 The government
failed to assemble enough votes in favor of
ratification, complicating bilateral initiatives
between the two countries’ space programs, and
questions raised during the congressional debate
left many Brazilians wary of working with the
United States on space issues. 68 Cooperation
appears to have improved since 2010, however,
with NASA and AEB agreeing to collaborate on
the multi-national Global Precipitation

65
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Measurement Mission and a future ozone study. 69
The two countries also held a Space Security
dialogue in April 2012. 70
Views on Proposed Space Agreements, Military
Use of Space, and Space Arms Control
Brazil has sought a role in international
negotiations on the state use of space, including
military space and space arms control issues. It
views itself as a key player in disarmament
debates, citing its generally peaceful history, lack
of military enemies, and long support for a range
of arms reduction and weapon-ban initiatives
(both in terms of nuclear arms and weapons in
outer space) at the UN General Assembly and the
UN CD. 71 As both a developing country and a
space power, Brazil believes it can speak to the
concerns of a broad range of current and future
space actors. 72 The Brazilian government states
that protecting outer space as a peaceful
environment free of weapons and armed conflict
is essential for developing states, who
increasingly rely on space systems (particularly
satellites) for economic growth but lack the
capabilities to protect these systems from the
actions or conflicts of major space powers. 73 It
has sounded the alarm in international negotiating
forums regarding what it fears is the impending
militarization of space, with its representative to
the UN CD stating in October 2012,

69
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The use of outer space for military
purposes is firmly underway. The
international community must work hard
and united in order to prevent the next
step: the placement of weapons [in
space]. 74
Brazil warns that a failure to make progress on
space arms control courts disaster, stating a future
conflict involving space systems could lead to a
total “global black-out” of modern
communications systems. 75
In surveying the current state of international
space law, Brazil believes discussions within UN
forums have revealed “the need of a multilateral
legal instrument to plug the loopholes remaining
in International Law on the matter of preventing
an arms race in outer space.” 76 It presses for
negotiation within the UN CD of a multilateral,
legally binding treaty to ban the threat or use of
force against space systems or the placement of
any kind of weapon in outer space. 77
Brazil welcomed Russia and China’s introduction
of the PPWT in 2008 and praised the draft treaty
as a “constructive and concrete contribution” to
diplomatic discussions addressing the issue of
weapons in space. It also noted, however, that “in
its present wording [the PPWT] is still a
schematic framework” requiring “more precise
language” before becoming a comprehensive
treaty fully addressing the concerns of Brazil and
like-minded states. 78 However, Brazil preferred
the PPWT’s approach to the EU’s Code of
Conduct, which it believed too broad in its
language and, as a politically binding agreement,
too weak to address near-term challenges in
74
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regard to the militarization of space. It has
specifically criticized the code’s express reference
to a state’s inherent right of self-defense to defend
its space assets, arguing this “could be interpreted
in a way that justifies the use of force in outer
space. That is a scenario we cannot afford to
contemplate, not even in theory.” 79
Brazil has also disparaged – without naming any
specific state – governments that support
negotiation of a politically binding, rather than a
legally binding, agreement on space security
issues, dismissing their arguments as “not
sustainable” in the long-term and “impossible” for
most of the international community to understand.
States that delay participation in diplomatic talks
aimed at preventing a future arms race in space, it
argues, are ultimately responsible for the
“increased mistrust” between them and spacefaring nations supportive of drafting a
comprehensive space arms control treaty. 80 This
advocacy on behalf of a legally binding approach
to the military use of space has led Brazil to issue
a publicly ambivalent statement on the UN GGE’s
pursuit of politically binding TCBMs, saying it
“does not refuse intermediate measures” that can
build trust and increase transparency between
space-faring states, so long as these are
recognized as an interim step preceding future
multilateral talks on a new space treaty. 81
However, Brazil has contributed an expert to the
GGE, and this involvement may lead to support
for the group’s future recommendations.
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Brazil remains committed to its vision of
becoming a major space power, and it has realized
a number of important goals for its national space
program. With a civilian space program that
remains dependent on other states for key forms
of assistance and a military deeply interested in
using space but waiting for its first (shared)
satellite, Brazil is a good example of an emerging
space power that recognizes and aspires to the
broad, networked civilian and military capabilities
available to space-faring nations such as the
United States and China. But Brazil faces
challenging near-term decisions on national
resources and bilateral cooperation that may
determine whether it can keep pace with countries
such as India or fall back into the growing pack of
countries that can build satellites but not launch
them into space.
Brazil is an emerging space power and over the
course of a generation has realized impressive
achievements in aviation and aerospace
engineering and manufacturing. It is also aware,
however, of the difficulties, hazards, and costs of
sending objects into space, and of the distance that
continues to separate it from the civilian and
military programs of major space-faring nations.
As a result, its views on military space reflect both
an interest in developing its own capabilities
contributing to tasks such as border defense and a
concern that major powers such as the United
States will take steps – whether direct or indirect –
jeopardizing the safety and security of smaller
space-faring nations.
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SOUTH AFRICA
Civilian and Military Space Programs
South Africa boasts a long history of
involvement in efforts to observe and explore
outer space. Its location in the Southern
Hemisphere has proven ideal for charting stars
and the course of human-made satellites. The first
South African space observatory was built in 1820
in Cape Town, and the English astronomer Sir
John Herschel conducted much of his research
(including his observation of Halley’s Comet in
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1835) while living in the country. 82 South Africa
also has a long-standing relationship with NASA.
During the first Space Age, the United States
partnered with South Africa to design and
manufacture a satellite that was launched on a
NASA Delta II rocket, and the space agency also
constructed and operated key satellite tracking
facilities within the country. 83 This cooperation
was later suspended due to congressional
opposition to Pretoria’s apartheid policies, but restarted in the 1990s following the election of
President Nelson Mandela. 84 In 1999, for
example, South Africa’s first satellite, the
Stellenbosch University Satellite (SUNSAT), was
launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
Into the 21st century, South Africa has remained
an important partner of the United States and
other space-faring nations. In 2011, for example,
it was selected by NASA as a key provider of
tracking data for the Curiosity Mars Rover
mission, and in 2012 it was chosen (along with
Australia) as the host of installations associated
with the Square Kilometre Array, which upon
completion will represent the world’s largest radio
telescope. 85 It has also taken a lead role in
82
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working with fellow African states to advance
regional space initiatives. South Africa is a key
member of the African Resource Management
Constellation (ARMC), a four-state coalition
(together with Algeria, Nigeria, and Kenya)
building a satellite network that aims to “make
space technology more accessible to African endusers in areas such as environmental monitoring,
land use, water management, and public health.” 86
South Africa has devoted considerable political
and economic capital to building up its national
space program. The country’s 2008 National
Space Policy recognizes that “in the 21st century,
countries capable of utilizing space systems will
enjoy considerable advantage over those who do
not” and notes the country is already “critically
reliant on space science and technology.” 87 In an
effort to consolidate and advance the country’s
efforts to boost its involvement in outer space,
South African President Jacob Zuma signed the
National Space Agency Act in 2009, bringing
together all of the country’s space programs and
missions under one unified agency -- the South
African National Space Agency (SANSA). 88
National legislation directs SANSA to
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Provide for the promotion and use of
space and co-operation in space-related
activities, foster research in Space Science,
advance scientific engineering through
human capital, support the creation of an
environment conducive to industrial
development in space technologies within
the framework of national government
policy. 89
The agency’s current strategic plan focuses on
four missions: (1) Earth observation (2) space
operations (3) space science and (4) space
engineering. 90 While recognizing it cannot
compete at the same level as the major space
powers, South Africa believes current investments
in its space program and in the development of
human capital in space-supporting fields will
allow it to “capture a global market share for
small to medium sized space systems” within a
decade. 91 Pretoria believes that becoming a
vendor within the growing international space
market will help the country realize its goal of
increasingly shifting to a modern knowledgebased economy. 92
The country also views investments in space
programs and capabilities as critical to its
security—with “security” encompassing both
traditional national security issues (such as
protecting national borders) and human security
matters (such as responding to natural disasters or
addressing water shortages affecting the health of
people and crops). 93 South Africa does not have a
dedicated military space program, but recognizes
89
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the importance of space assets to national defense
(including tasks such as border control), regional
security initiatives, and arms control verification,
stating that it will develop space assets capable of
supporting “defense, peacekeeping, and treaty
monitoring” initiatives. 94
Views on Proposed Space Agreements, Military
Use of Space, and Space Arms Control
South Africa’s determination to become
an important player amongst emerging space
powers has led the country to devote domestic
political capital to developing its national space
program and international diplomatic capital to
gaining recognition as a key participant within
negotiating forums on space treaties and
agreements. 95 It became the first African member
of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1994 and is currently
one of the most active states within the committee.
In regard to international space law, in 2011 it
established a national registry of space objects as
part of its effort to accede to the 1976 Convention
on the Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, and in 2012 it completed ratification
of the 1972 Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects. 96
94
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Conventions on Outer Space,” press release, February
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“As an emerging space actor,” explained South
African diplomat Megan Govendar in an October
19, 2012 General Assembly address on outer
space issues, “South Africa wishes to contribute to
the orderly, peaceful and safe utilisation of the
space environment, for the benefit of all
nations.” 97 Pretoria believes these contributions
are best made through the United Nations system,
viewing bodies such as COPUOS as the best
means for negotiating and implementing accords
that will address challenges associated with the 3
C’s and protect the interests of emerging space
powers. 98 South Africa believes it is important to
support “the development of international norms
for the use of outer space,” with these norms
grounded in “principles of fairness, equal access
and non-discrimination” that protect space – and
the “benefits” derived from it – for all states,
including those that are not yet space-faring
nations. 99
South Africa has also indicated, however, that it
believes an international agreement or mechanism
attempting to address space sustainability “need[s]
to take into account the different circumstances,
particularly each State’s contribution to the
evolution of a particular problem and its ability to
prevent, reduce and control the extent of that
problem.” 100 This echoes the language of other
emerging space powers (such as India), who
believe that, while all current space powers must
act responsibly in space, major space powers bear
an additional responsibility for clearing debris and
otherwise taking steps to resolve problems created
by their past use of space.
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In the past, South Africa has supported
multilateral initiatives aimed at negotiating an
international legal framework for limiting or
banning armaments from outer space. It has
regularly supported PAROS resolutions at the UN
General Assembly, for example. 101 It has also
argued at the UN CD that the international
community must take steps to prevent the
deployment of weapons in space, with South
African representative Michael Combrink stating
in February 2011, “If we wait for space to become
weaponized before we take action, it will not be
long before we have to find yet another cure for
something that could have been prevented—the
proliferation of weapons in outer space.” 102
Beyond PAROS, however, Pretoria has stopped
short of directly endorsing a new international
space draft treaty or agreement.103 Within his
February 2011 statement, for example, Combrink
stated that South Africa “particularly appreciates
the efforts of the Chinese and Russian delegations
and their ideas on moving the process forward,”
but did not expressly support the PPWT. South
Africa, he continued, supported the CD
“negotiating an international instrument” on
preventing arms competitions in space.104 The use
of general terms such as “ideas” and “instrument”
(the latter could refer to a legally binding treaty or
politically binding agreement) within his
statement likely reflects Pretoria’s interest in
participating in future space arms control talks
without tipping its hand regarding what type of
diplomatic agreement it is prepared to support.
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South Africa’s current engagement with
international efforts to address the 3 C’s is
through a scientific and technical expert: Peter
Martinez, Ph.D., Chair of South Africa’s Council
on Space Affairs. At present, he is the Chair of
COPUOS’ Working Group on the Long Term
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities and is
also a member of the UN GGE. 105 The Working
Group will report its findings to the United
Nations in 2014, with the final text prepared by
Martinez. 106 South Africa’s national delegation at
COPUOS firmly backs the efforts of Martinez and
his colleagues on both expert committees. 107
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preserving space accessibility for future potential
operations and assets. The latter thus oppose any
measures making it more difficult or expensive to
place or operate objects in space and are generally
wary of major powers endorsing measures that act
as “double standards” preserving their use of
space at the expense of others. 109

Although not tasked with addressing the military
use of space, the work of the Sustainability
Working Group may produce findings and
recommendations that are relevant to ongoing
international debates on national security and
outer space. The group is currently investigating
possible “best practices” for addressing current
threats to the safety of space operations (such as
space debris) and assessing current regulatory
frameworks (at both national and international
levels) governing or guiding the use of space, with
an eye toward identifying general “technical
standards” and “guidance” that could serve as
possible benchmarks for all space actors.108
Martinez’ views on addressing the challenge of
maintaining the “sustainability” of space may
reflect South Africa’s experience as a partner of
both established and emerging space powers. He
has noted, for example, that major powers are
primarily concerned with enhancing space
“security” (in order to protect their current
operations and assets in space), while emerging
powers with few space assets worry more about

South Africa is an emerging space power that
recognizes the potential benefits of space assets
for the security of its citizens, whether in terms of
securing its borders or protecting its population
from natural disasters. It is interested in the future
development of a military space program,
although it would likely initially pursue systems
with dual civilian/military uses – a path Brazil is
pursuing and not dissimilar to the EU’s approach
to developing satellites with capabilities that will
be shared by civilian agencies and military
services. 110 Civilian science and commercial
programs, however, come first for South Africa –
and many emerging space powers – due to limits
on resources and an interest in strategic
investment in capabilities that will either generate
future revenue (allowing a country to capture a
niche in the international space market) or save
costs (by improving use of water and other scarce
resources). This focus on civilian applications,
and recognition that South Africa will not possess
space defense/deterrence capabilities in the near
future, leads Pretoria to preach caution on issues
surrounding the military use of space and urge all
states to protect outer space as an open, peaceful
environment. However, as a state that, on space
issues, is outside of the complex dynamics driving
competition between some of the larger space
powers, South Africa – and the country’s space
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experts, such as Martinez – can play an important
role in exploring avenues of potential cooperation,
to include possible confidence-building measures,
for all space-faring nations.
UNITED STATES AND EMERGING SPACE
POWERS: POTENTIAL AREAS OF
AGREEMENT AND ISSUES TO ADDRESS
What conclusions can we draw from this
survey of the civilian and military space programs
of these three emerging space powers and their
views on the military use of space and space arms
control?
1. The United States must continue to
patiently and persistently counter statements
from other states regarding the possible nearterm or “imminent” weaponization of space
and/or the likelihood of major powers initiating
an arms race within space.

and registering its opposition to initiatives seeking
legally binding measures to ban weapons and
conflict in outer space. Inasmuch as only a
handful of space-faring states have fully supported
draft texts such as the PPWT, many emerging
space powers have communicated their concern
that military competition in space, however
realized, may make access to space too dangerous
and costly for actors that cannot afford to develop
or deploy sophisticated military space assets.
These concerns are readily on display in the
public statements made by emerging space powers
at the UN First Committee, UN CD, UN
COPOUS, and other diplomatic forums.
The prospects of a major power arms race in outer
space are extremely remote. Significantly, during
the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union
reached agreement on leaving the Moon and other
celestial bodies free of military fortifications and
banning nuclear weapons tests and deployments in
outer space. Moreover, both countries voluntarily
suspended their ASAT programs due in part to a
realization these weapons, even if successful in
destroying enemy satellites, would cause debris
that could damage or destroy the attacking states’
own space systems. The large price tags
associated with developing, placing, and operating
weapons platforms in space are also likely to
dissuade many governments from considering
these types of systems.

The United States represents the world’s only
current superpower, both on Earth and in outer
space. Of importance, even a rising space power
such as India, which claims it can quickly
assemble an ASAT, currently only possesses a
nascent and relatively limited military space
program (whether measured in terms of personnel
or capabilities). Brazil’s military is still waiting
for its first satellite, and South Africa recognizes
the defense applications of a military space
program but currently devotes all of its resources
to civilian space assets. As a military space power
with dedicated constellations of military satellites,
an air force major command devoted to space, and
military space assets and operations fully
integrated across critical mission areas, the United
States remains far ahead of the military space
programs of even the most capable emerging
space powers.

In this context, warnings regarding possible arms
races in space can appear curiously misplaced, a
relic of the darker days of the Cold War. This is
not to overlook the potential problems posed by
China and India’s interest in ground-based ASATs,
but these systems – while representing threats to
space-based assets – are a far cry from the threat
to space safety, security, and stability posed by an
orbital weapons platform.

As a result of this imbalance, many emerging
space powers – including those on friendly terms
with the United States – are wary of U.S. military
space programs and future U.S. intentions
regarding the development of new military
capabilities for space. Moreover, they have
observed the United States consistently voting
against PAROS resolutions within the UN
General Assembly – often as a minority of one –

Fortunately, such a military system exists only in
the realm of science fiction. Statements by
emerging space powers on potential arms races in
outer space, however, reflect a real fear that their
space assets are highly vulnerable and that they
cannot, for the foreseeable future, come close to
the military space programs (however configured)
of the established space powers. Left unaddressed,
these concerns threaten to seriously complicate
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efforts by the United States and its allies to focus
attention on the 3 C’s. They also increase the
likelihood that emerging powers will support
broad proposals seeking to limit military activities
in space that the United States will oppose either
due to their lack of verification measures or
infringement upon the lawful use of space by U.S.
military assets. The United States should continue
to patiently and persistently reiterate in
international negotiating forums – and bilaterals
with emerging space powers – that it has no plans
to build, test, or deploy space-based offensive
weapons systems.
2. Key emerging space powers will,
however, increasingly distinguish between nonweaponized military space systems and “space
weapons,” opening opportunities for direct
dialogues and quiet diplomacy on military
space matters.
While a number of emerging space
powers fear the possibility that major powers
might place weapons in space, the increasing
availability of satellite technology – and
increasing importance of satellite communications
and imagery – has also led several of these states
to recognize the significant national security
benefits of placing non-weaponized military
satellites (or dual civilian-military satellites) in
outer space. For example, of the three emerging
space powers discussed in this analysis, Brazil
represents the strongest proponent of a legally
binding ban on weapons in outer space and is a
vocal critic of states that have not agreed to
discuss this type of ban within the CD. Brazil,
however, also views the development of a
military-civilian secure communications satellite
as a top priority for its national space program.
As discussed above, it recognizes that satellite
imagery is vital to protecting its borders and
natural resources from state and non-state actors.
Moreover, India, Brazil, and South Africa
all seek synergy between national space policies,
defense strategies, and economic development
priorities. The increasing integration of defense,
development, and space goals reflects their
realization that having a presence in space – to
include systems wholly or partly assigned to
national security tasks – is critically important in a
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globalized, networked, 21st century geopolitical
environment.
These developments help create opportunities for
positive dialogues between the United States and
emerging space powers on the legitimate, peaceful
use of space through the deployment of military
assets. Many emerging space powers have either
espoused – or been influenced by – negative
arguments positing the military use of space as
inherently dangerous and destabilizing. This
dichotomy, however, appears to be breaking
down; in its place, the United States is wellpositioned to advocate on behalf of military
systems using outer space in the same manner that
the international community recognizes the right
of military vessels to use the high seas.
Furthermore, while the United States does not
discuss the economic benefits of space in terms of
“development,” the development/defense/space
concept held by emerging space powers is similar
to long-standing U.S. views that a robust military
space program helps create the conditions for the
free, open, and safe use of space by all responsible
space actors – conditions that, in turn, are vital to
peace and economic prosperity.
In short, the increasing normalization and
regularization of military space systems to the
national plans of emerging space powers will
likely allow future bilateral discussions between
the United States and these countries on the
military use of space to focus on areas of
agreement and perhaps even identify areas of
future potential cooperation (such as activities
related to verification of multilateral treaties).
3. Emerging powers support exploring
new transparency and confidence-building
measures (TCBMs) to address some or all of
the 3 C’s and also support the UN GGE
approach to developing these proposals.
Emerging space powers are broadly supportive of
greater transparency between national space
programs, welcoming exchanges of information
on space policies and activities. Many believe
efforts to improve space security are hampered by
the major powers’ reluctance to share more
information about their space activities. States
such as Brazil and South Africa, for example, do
not believe they currently face any military
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adversaries in space. As such, they do not
anticipate any risks in sharing information on their
space programs with foreign states.
Emerging powers also welcome discussion of new
TCBMs for state activities in outer space. India,
for example, despite its concerns regarding
China’s potential military space capabilities, has
indicated it can support TCBMs as an interim step
toward a future legally binding agreement on
space. India may calculate that helping overcome
Beijing’s general reluctance to share information
on its military space- or ground-based ASAT
programs provides greater long-term benefits than
the costs of sharing some information on its own
(relatively limited) military space program.
In addition, it appears that a number of emerging
space powers have joined established space-faring
states in concluding that the PPWT and ICoC
approaches to addressing elements of the 3 C’s
both failed to garner a broad base of support
across the community of space-faring nations.
For many states, TCBMs to ameliorate specific
problems such as space traffic management or
kinetic energy ASAT testing represent a potential
third way to break this impasse. While states such
as Brazil and India have stated that TCBMs are
not a substitute for a legally binding treaty
addressing space security issues, they have also
stated that these measures could represent either
catalysts or building blocks for a future accord.
Furthermore, the inclusion of experts from a range
of space-faring nations within the UN GGE
addresses the emerging space power concern that
they are often shut out of major power discussions
on important space issues. The participation of
Brazilian and South African experts in the GGE
increases the likelihood these states will support
the recommendations of the group on proposals
for new space TCBMs. With both states viewing
themselves as bearing a responsibility to speak on
behalf of the community of emerging space
powers, these experts bring a broad perspective to
space security and stability issues that will help
the GGE develop TCBMs that can gain the
approval of a broad range of space-faring states.

CONCLUSION: CONFRONTING THE 3 C’s
WITH EMERGING SPACE POWERS
WHILE PROTECTING THE LEGITIMATE
MILITARY USE OF SPACE
Emerging space powers share many of the
same concerns as the United States on the 3 C’s.
This raises the prospect of future cooperation in
addressing these challenges—cooperation that
could include efforts to negotiate future
international space agreements.
In discussing, drafting, or reviewing these
agreements, however, the United States must
ensure it protects its critical military operations
and assets in outer space. In working with
emerging powers, the United States should
recognize that many of these states lack robust
military space programs, are uncertain of the
future military space plans of the United States,
and are deeply concerned that major space powers
may undertake military actions that, whether
directly or indirectly, severely limit or prevent
their own access to space. As a result, their
efforts to address aspects of the 3 C’s may include
inequitable, unverifiable, or simply unworkable
proposals with the potential to negatively impact
the U.S. military’s legitimate use of space.
However, emerging powers increasingly
recognize their economies and populations can
reap significant benefits from national or shared
space assets and, moreover, that military space
operations can play a key role in enabling and
protecting these systems within an insecure space
environment.
As a result, the United States will likely find it
increasingly possible to have useful dialogues
with these countries on a broad range of TCBMs
or other multilateral space accords that approach
the military use of space as a potential “force
multiplier” for the public good—and help them
protect their limited, valuable space assets that
have dual national security/civilian applications.
Building bridges between established and
emerging space powers will help the United States
find partners in ongoing efforts to improve the
safety, security, and stability of outer space and
will also protect the U.S. military’s ability to
continue the responsible, legal use of space to
enable critical missions around the globe and
across the “high frontier.”
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International Commercial Avenues to Complement
Deterrence Actions
Jonty Kasku-Jackson

The world relies heavily on services
provided by satellite assets, but ensuring the
safety and security of those assets is extremely
difficult. 1 Classic deterrence approaches rely
almost exclusively on the threat of force to
dissuade one state from acting against the interests
of another. Although classic deterrence was
arguably successful against a single adversary
during the Cold War, it seems insufficient in the
current multipolar strategic environment. In
addition to state actors, the strategic environment
is complicated by a number of non-state players in
space. Some scholars present a theory in which a
state could dominate earth if it could only achieve
military control of space.2 This article does not
address that approach nor does it address
weaponization although it does touch on dual use
of space. Instead, it addresses whether it may be
time to examine additional, complementary
actions that could supplement classic deterrence
actions. Specifically, this paper examines the
potential to use international arbitration and
litigation mechanisms to complement classic
deterrence actions.

theories, information is also an essential element
that impacts a state’s economy. 3 While there are a
number of ways to move information from place
to place, commercial space capabilities play a
critical role in transporting that information. That
role is reflected in the growth in the commercial
space industry.

The Current Space Strategic Environment

In 2012 revenue for the SATCOM sector was
assessed to be $19.32B, and approximately half of
those revenues were generated by only four
providers - Intelsat, SES, Eutelsat, and Telsat.
The growing market for space capabilities to
support state and non-state players indicates the
vested interest both users and providers of space
services have in ensuring satellites transporting
critical information remain untouched. Because
SATCOM makes up such a large portion of the
space industry, it will serve as a good context to
examine whether international dispute resolution

The global economic and security arenas
rapidly are becoming information based. States
increasingly rely on space capabilities to send and
receive information they must have to pursue their
security interests. Under some current economic
1
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In 2012, the global space industry (commercial
space revenues and government space spending
together) was assessed to be $304.31B.
Commercial space products and services
accounted for $115.97B. The market for satellite
communications (SATCOM), assessed to be
$113.61B, is expected to continue to increase.
Some research assesses there will be 220 million
homes in 80 countries that receive Direct-toHome Television (DHT) services by 2017. 4
While some might not consider DHT information
services essential to a state, they are used for teleeducation and telemedicine, which are important
state interests. The DHT market also reflects the
growing individual and business interest in
SATCOM.
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mechanisms (arbitration and litigation) could be
suitable complements to deterrence.
Deterrence Then and Now
It is useful to examine the development of
classic deterrence and consider its weakness
before examining international dispute resolution
mechanisms. Deterrence strategy was developed
by U.S. policy makers during the Cold War and
was intended to prevent two superpowers with
nuclear weapons from using those weapons. Each
superpower attempted to influence the other to
prevent an undesired behavior. Each state
weighed the potential cost of its proposed action
against the potential benefit of that action. Three
elements were, and still are, required for
deterrence to work. First, the state wishing to
dissuade the other must have the capability for
coercion. Second, it must be perceived to have
the intent to use that capability. Finally, it must
clearly communicate that intent to the state it
wishes to deter. As deterrence strategy matured
during the Cold War, two aspects developed. One
aspect, general deterrence, is based on current
power relationships and attempts to prevent an
adversary from seriously considering any kind of
military challenge because of expected adverse
consequences. 5 [Emphasis added]. The second
aspect, immediate deterrence, has been described
as “specific” and it attempts to forestall an
anticipated challenge to a well-defined and
publicized commitment. It is practiced when
general deterrence is thought to be failing. 6
[Emphasis added]. It is essential to note that
deterrence has been developed as a way to prevent
undesired action between states and not nationals
or corporations within the state.
A primary weakness with classic deterrence is that
it was developed to focus on a single state in a
bipolar environment. According to Avery

Goldstein, a state must not only consider what an
opposing state believes, it must also consider
allies and partners in its calculations.7 This was
not a problem during the Cold War when there
were only two players but it is now in the current
multipolar environment. He also asserts a large
state may not act against smaller states with
impunity or its reputation might be damaged and
that it must protect smaller partners from
undesired actions of others in order to preserve its
own reputation. 8 In space there are a handful of
major space players but numerous smaller players
and each has its own interests to protect. This
environment provides many opportunities for
complications and misunderstandings. Applying
deterrence to that environment is problematic.
Another weakness of deterrence is that it assumes
each state’s definition of “rational” is the same.
As Keith Payne points out, a key assumption of
nuclear deterrence between the United States and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
was that each state was rational. During the Cold
War the United States believed the USSR was a
rational actor as the United States defined
“rational.” According to U.S. calculations both
states were assessed to be mutually vulnerable to
the other’s nuclear arsenal. Therefore neither
would initiate a nuclear war since it would lead to
the mutual destruction of both. The United States
believed this ability to mutually destroy each
other created stability. It appears however that the
U.S. and USSR definitions of “rational” differed
considerably. The United States considered
nuclear war to be unthinkable and assumed the
USSR believed the same. Evidence now shows
that USSR war plans actually included use of
nuclear weapons in Western Europe during the
very early stages of a war. The USSR expectation
of the United States appeared to be shaped more
by ideology than by Western deterrence theory. 9
This most basic misunderstanding seems to be
exacerbated by the fact that the personal interests
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and beliefs of a state leader may significantly
influence what a state considers to be rational.10
Difficulties with “Space Deterrence”
There have been a number of recent
attempts to adapt classic deterrence theory into
“space deterrence.” Under space deterrence, as in
classic deterrence, relative dominance between
states is very important. Deterrence will likely be
less effective if there is little relative difference
between the players since a significantly weaker
power, such as North Korea, has little to lose and
much to gain. Although the major spacefaring
nations may be competing to dominate the space
medium, numerous other states have a limited
presence in space or aspire to have a presence in
space. While the prestige associated with a
presence in space is great, small or aspiring states
rely very little on space to directly secure their
national interests. This leads to a situation where
a handful of major actors, heavily reliant on space,
are disproportionally vulnerable to many small
states. The stability previously promised by
mutually assured destruction between two major
states is lost. It may therefore be dangerous to
extrapolate classic nuclear deterrence into space
deterrence.
Another key weakness in applying classic
deterrence to space is the difficulty in attributing
interference with a satellite to a specific actor.
There is general agreement that interference
ranges from temporary and non-destructive to
complete destruction. However, there appears to
be no specific, generally accepted definition of
“interference”. The Outer Space Treaty 11 does not
specifically define interference although it
requires parties to undertake appropriate
consultations if their activities in outer space
“would cause potential harmful interference with
10
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activities of other States Parties…” 12 The
proposed Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat
or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects uses
the terms “use of force” and “threat of force” 13
instead. The proposed Code of Conduct 14 defines
anti-satellite weapons and space weapons but not
interference.
Since treaties do not define interference, states are
free to interpret as they see fit. The U.S. National
Space Policy specifically mentions both
interference and attack. 15 Japan’s Basic Plan on
Space Policy uses the term interference only in the
context of navigation satellites being susceptible
to “interference from other radio stations.” 16 The
English translation of the Whitepaper on China’s
Space Activities in 2011 does not even use the
term “interference”.17 The absence of a clear
definition of interference may provide a great
amount of flexibility to the states to protect their
interests. It also may provide the greatest amount
of instability as states are uncertain what activities
would be considered interference and therefore
likely to provoke a response.
Assuming an interfering actor could be identified,
it is highly unlikely a state would retaliate due to
12
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intentional much less accidental inference. There
is too high a chance that retaliation could escalate
a conflict out of control. 18 It would also be very
difficult for a state to meaningfully retaliate
against the interfering actor—especially if it had
little or no presence in space. In addition to the
technological limitations associated with
identifying who is interfering with a satellite,
there are other political and legal factors to
consider. Goldstein points out that a state must
not only consider what an opposing state believes,
but must also consider allies and partners in its
calculations. Furthermore, he asserts a large state
may not act against smaller states with impunity
or its reputation might be tarnished. Conversely it
must protect smaller partners from undesired
actions of others in order to preserve its
reputation. 19
In space there are only a handful of major players
but there are numerous smaller players that must
be considered. Payne posits a framework that
focuses on identifying potential challengers and
building a profile of each to develop deterrence
actions. 20 A framework that profiles each small
state challenger is almost essential to conduct cost
benefit analyses. However, this approach, tailored
to specific challengers, would require significant
resources. Practical application also would be
daunting as developing and considering profiles of
60 or more states would complicate calculations
to the point of uselessness. Additionally, a state
would need to consider any unintended
consequences to each state for every action it
takes.
In contrast to Payne, Forest E. Morgan examines a
first-strike capability in which two or more states
are mutually deterred not to attack first, thus
creating stability. It focuses on each side’s force
posture and the balance of capabilities and
vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable
should a confrontation occur. 21 Although nuclear
18
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21
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weapons are not involved, Morgan sees a number
of parallels to a first-strike capability in space. He
notes that satellites are difficult to defend and that
it could be very costly if deterrence fails.
Additionally he asserts that both nuclear and
space deterrence have significant thresholds
which could lead to reprisal and escalation if they
are crossed. 22 Morgan seems to extend the
fundamental tenets of nuclear deterrence to space
deterrence.
However, he also asserts that thresholds of
deterrence would differ depending on the specific
space system involved and the level of war.
Reversible attacks would be less severely
punished while destructive attacks that create
debris would be more severely attacked. Nuclear
detonations in space, for example, would be most
severely punished. 23 Morgan’s approach also
assumes that space deterrence would become a
function of escalation and that “a savvy adversary
might continue to abstain from destroying U.S.
satellites in a limited war for fears of escalating
the conflict…” 24 However, he also notes there are
some circumstances in which an adversary might
not be deterred from using any level of destructive
force in space, particularly if the state feels an
existential threat or if it believes it can absorb the
punishment necessary to benefit from its actions.25
For example, North Korea insists it needs nuclear
capabilities to protect itself from being annihilated
by the U.S. However its reliance on space is
virtually non-existent. Therefore, it is very
unlikely it would be deterred from using any level
of force in space. There is also the underlying
problem that Payne identifies where a leader’s
personal beliefs will impact the definition of
“savvy” and any cost benefit analysis conducted.
Furthermore, it complicates attempts to deny an
adversary the benefits of its actions, and Morgan
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suggests emphasizing resilience of space systems
to mitigate that issue. 26
Jay Finch and Shawne Steene continue the line of
reasoning laid out by Morgan. Unlike Morgan,
they assert critical differences between space
systems and nuclear weapons necessarily change
how deterrence theory would be applied. Similar
to Morgan they base their analysis on the
assumption that counterspace weapons range from
those that cause reversible damage to a target to
those that permanently destroy a target. 27 Finch
and Steene assert that because of this, space
deterrence should work on two levels. On one
level, deterrence threats should discourage actions
that cause either reversible or permanent harm to a
satellite system. On a second level, stability in
space must also be considered in a broader
deterrence relationship between potential
adversaries. 28 They point to developing
international norms as a means to condition
adversaries as to what is acceptable and what is
not. 29
Norms are common understandings, accepted by
most participants. Given the difficulty of getting
the major space players to agree on a set of norms
regarding activities in space, it is unlikely that
those who don’t agree with the norms would be
deterred. The authors do examine enhancing
resilience, augmentation, and the ability to operate
in a degraded environment, and they recommend
tailoring specific approaches to specific
situations. 30 There seems to be broad recognition
of difficulties with extrapolating classic
deterrence into space. It is particularly difficult in
the event of interference with a consortium-owned,
commercial satellite.
The practical difficulties in applying
classic deterrence to space seem to argue for
additional complementary non-deterrence actions
to dissuade interference with satellites. Karl
26
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Mueller includes a “rewards and reassurance”
aspect to his discussion of deterrence in which a
state “seeks to make aggression or escalation less
attractive by making the status quo look more
beneficial or less dangerous to the potential
adversary.” 31 Using international dispute
resolution mechanisms could contribute to
increasing the appeal of the status quo, thus
contributing to Mueller’s “rewards and
reassurance” subset of deterrence. Because
dispute resolution is not state specific, it is
considered to be a contributor to deterrence and
not a subset of deterrence. Actions that are not
state-focused might be useful when commercial
entities are involved.
Determining what is commercial, however, is
difficult since the terms of the space treaties do
not determine whether activities are for national
security, civil, or commercial purposes. Often,
security-civil and commercial space activities
blend together into dual use. This is exacerbated
by the way in which states organize their space
programs. For example the U.S. has a civil sector,
a defense/intelligence sector and a commercial
sector. The commercial sector includes
corporations whose primary customers are the
civil and defense/intelligence sectors. However,
they are still considered commercial. China does
not differentiate between its sectors and the exact
role played by the military, the corporations and
the different academic institutions is unclear.32
Many of its corporations are state owned but are
still arguably commercial since they are not an
official state agency.
Since it is possible to define commercial to
include entities with significant state involvement,
the option to use dispute resolution channels may
be available. Commercial satellite service
providers sell a wide variety of services to an
31
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extensive clientele that may or may not be states.
Due to that wide clientele and their relative
monopoly on satellite services, commercial
satellite providers seem to wield increasing
influence in the current global economic
environment. Deterrence, as previously discussed,
applies to states not individuals. It is worthwhile,
then, to examine different concepts of state
sovereignty as they could influence any course of
action chosen.

available to both nationals of a state and the states
themselves, would preclude neither Westphalian
sovereignty nor the cosmopolitan concept of
sovereignty. Indeed, agents within this regime
collectively could support traditional Westphalian
sovereignty or construct cosmopolitan sovereignty
as desired.

Deterrence approaches assume the current
Westphalian definition of sovereignty, which
delineates a clear relationship between
sovereignty, territory, and the state. 33 This poses
some difficulty when discussing activities in space
since the Outer Space Treaty forbids claims of
sovereignty. 34 Jill Stuart argues for an alternative
concept of sovereignty in which outer space has
been delinked or “unbundled” from territory. 35
Her idea of cosmopolitan sovereignty would treat
outer space as an issue-area, inherently
transnational, which contributes to its greater
sense of global community. 36 Under this new
formulation individuals are the primary political
agents, 37 which would seem to support using
systems designed to be used by individuals rather
than states.

Although applying deterrence alone
within the current strategic space environment
may be insufficient, using a complementary, nondeterrence approach could be useful. Such an
approach would not be based on the international
space treaties but would be based on international
dispute resolution laws and processes. Since the
world today is dependent on information in a way
not historically seen, the focus of any actions
should be on protecting that information. Rather
than focusing on the threat of force, let the U.S.
consider leveraging economic entanglement
between commercial space providers and the
states.

However, it is unclear whether cosmopolitan
sovereignty is achievable or desired. Even if
space is considered to be inherently transnational,
there will almost certainly be actions or effects
within inter-state politics. Some sort of dispute
resolution mechanisms would still need to be
developed. Rather than attempting to change the
current sovereignty definitions and concepts, it
would be simpler and more achievable to use
current dispute resolution processes. Using
international dispute resolution mechanisms,
33
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International Business Interests and Dispute
Resolution Processes

Commercial space providers supply invaluable
global information transportation capabilities.
States, individuals, nongovernmental
organizations, and businesses all contract for
space services. Arguably, commercial space
providers may be seen as having a
disproportionate amount of economic and political
influence due to their near monopoly of the
market. Since there are very few providers of a
particular space service, a provider may choose
not to sell services to a customer it deems a risk to
future revenues. A provider could also charge a
higher price for one customer than another
regardless of whether the customer is a state, an
individual, or another non-state entity. Because
of this, it seems sensible to look at international
business interests and dispute-resolution processes.
International business practices, dispute resolution
processes, and enforcement mechanisms are fairly
well documented and accepted. There are a
number of international business norms and
international legal regimes designed to regulate
and enforce contractual obligations among
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international business organizations. 38 Using
established dispute resolution processes sidesteps
the political sensitivities associated with
deterrence and its focus on use of force. Using
both dispute resolution and deterrence are possible
since, in general, both states and businesses are
concerned with two foundational interests.
Both are concerned with security and prosperity in
one form or another. Commercial entities appear
to be interested in profit and secure markets.
States are concerned with national security and
prosperity. Both commercial and state interests
are inextricably intertwined. In order for a state to
be secure, it must have sufficient resources, labor,
and technology to defend itself from external
threats and care for its domestic population.
Traditionally, resources are considered to be
physical materials that reside within a state’s
borders. In the context of this article, the primary
resource in question is information that routinely
crosses state borders. Secondary resources are
considered to be the commercial SATCOM
satellites transporting that information. The states
have an interest in protecting both the information
and the SATCOM satellites themselves. However,
in order for the commercial SATCOM providers
to transport the information states require, the
providers must be profitable and stable. To be
profitable, commercial SATCOM providers need
a stable environment in which they can conduct
business. They seek to establish a reputation for
reliability that will facilitate an expanded
customer base and secure long term markets. The
responsibility of the state is to provide that stable
environment. However, the state needs
information to inform and shape the actions it
needs to take to ensure that stability. States and
commercial providers, therefore, are mutually
reliant on the other.

32

security requirement that requires it to remain
technologically more advanced than its neighbors.
If the state chooses to satisfy that need by strictly
regulating technology, it may adversely affect the
commercial providers it relies on. If the controls
are too onerous, then commercial SATCOM
providers may lose the opportunity to partner with
other commercial providers or might not even be
allowed to provide services to other parties. The
result could be commercial providers are no
longer able to compete in the international market,
threatening short-term profitability and long-term
markets. In one sense, the state is more secure
because the flow of technology has been reduced,
allowing it to stay ahead of other states. In
another sense the state’s security is actually
reduced because information it needs to pursue its
security interests is no longer available from
commercial providers. In some cases, states
become primary customers for SATCOM services,
regardless of a politically stable environment,
simply to ensure that commercial providers
survive. 39
Given the importance states place on the
information they receive from commercial
providers, entanglement of interests is
unsurprising. It is also unsurprising because states
typically desire to protect technological
advantages developed by the commercial space
sector. Scott Pace asserts dual-use space
technologies “have a great potential to shape
which national capabilities actually occur and
whether American interests are advanced or
harmed as they are adopted in global markets.” 40
Adoption of technology that shapes the ways a
state pursues its national interests is important,
and the information provided by that technology
is as important.

In some cases, immediate or short-term interests
may conflict. For example, a state might have a

There is some concern about potential
ramifications of commercial businesses providing
space capabilities for an adversarial actor that
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might be unable to develop its own capabilities.41
However, the number of states and commercial
entities that can do this is extremely limited. Few
have the monetary and intellectual capital
necessary to develop, build, and operate any
satellite system, much less sophisticated,
expensive, communications satellites. Of more
concern is the fact that commercial SATCOM
providers are usually made up of a consortium of
actors. These satellite communications companies
are also often in partnership with each other.
Commercial SATCOM providers effectively
monopolize space capabilities states need to
pursue their national interests giving them
disproportionate influence in political and
economic arenas. According to Robert Gilpin,
even in democracies, a relatively elite group of
players tend to determine national interest and
foreign policy within a state. 42 Commercial space
providers could be considered one such powerful
elite. If their domination of the SATCOM market
did not make them powerful actors in itself, then
the states’ heavy reliance on their services and
technologies would.
International Commercial Business
Interests
As a powerful group, it would not be
surprising if commercial space providers were to
attempt to influence international markets to their
advantage. 43 The commercial sector has already
demonstrated its global influence when it created
data associations in which satellite companies
share data amongst themselves. The Space Data
Association (SDA) was created in order to
supplement or replace the data previously
provided via state resources. In 2009, an Iridium
satellite and an inactive Russian-owned Kosmos
satellite collided.44 In 2010, a communications
41

Annals of Air and Space Law, Vol. XXX-II,
(Montreal:McGill University, 2005), 398.
42
Gilpin, Global Political Economy, 18
43
Ibid., 78. Gilpin presumes that states, multinational
corporations, and other powerful actors attempt to use
their power to influence the nature of international
regimes.
44
Peter B. de Selding, “Intelsat Moving Recovered
Galaxy 15 to Test Location”, Spacenews, (7 January
2011), http://www.spacenews.com/article/intelsatmoving-recovered-galaxy-15-test-location. First, in

satellite with active transponders drifted from its
assigned orbital slot. That satellite still had active
transponders, creating potential interference with
neighboring satellites. Both incidents illustrated
the potential for severe harm to commercial
SATCOM providers. In the first case, the
providers lost all revenue generated by the Iridium
satellite. In the second case, the potential for
harm was significantly greater since the rogue
satellite could have impacted up to 15 other
communications satellites owned by SES, Telesat,
and Satmex. 45 Intelsat would not only have lost
revenue from its satellite but could also have been
liable for interference with the other satellites.
In reaction to the latter Galaxy 15 incident,
Inmarsat, Intelsat, and SES created the
aforementioned Space Data Association (Eutelsat,
the fourth member of the ‘top four,’ joined
later). 46 The SDA was created to provide the
necessary legal and technical framework to
improve the accuracy of collision avoidance
predictions, which could be seen as protecting and
increasing revenue. 47 The technical framework
facilitated the actual sharing of data among
competitors. Data sharing minimizes the chance
of collisions and interference between satellites,
thereby minimizing potential loss of revenue by
members. Importantly, the SDA legal framework
is designed to enforce appropriate behavior of all
February of 2009, Iridium 33 and Kosmos-2251
collided at high velocity, destroying both. Second, In
April 2010, Intelsat lost control of its Galaxy 15
communications satellite which drifted away from its
orbital slot with still active transponders, creating
potential interference with neighboring satellites.
Satellite control was reestablished on 23 December
2010.
45
De Selding, “Intelsat Moving Recovered Galaxy,”
http://www.spacenews.com/article/intelsat-movingrecovered-galaxy-15-test-location.
46
http://www.space-data.org/sda/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2013/03/20130318_SDA_u
sers_Mtg_p.m._Session_FINAL.pdf. As of May 2013,
fifteen operators, controlling a little over half (227) the
geosynchronous satellites, participate in SDA. Another
five operators controlling ninety-two low earth orbit
satellites also participate (last accessed 23 July 2013).
47
http://www.space-data.org/sda/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2013/03/20130318_SDA_u
sers_Mtg_p.m._Session_FINAL.pdf (last accessed 21
July 2013).
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participants. 48 The legal framework protects each
company’s data, thus facilitating sharing of that
data. Without that legal framework, the
companies would probably not share their data
with competitors regardless of their technological
capability to do so. One could consider this
visionary and well-designed framework as
positive indication that the SDA is one of those
“powerful organizations” identified by Gilpin.
Although the SDA could be a ‘powerful
organization’, it cannot directly avail itself of
current international space treaties. Among state
actors, these treaties codify the importance of
space. The International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), for example, recognized the
importance of SATCOM in its constitution and
drafted provisions to coordinate efforts to
eliminate harmful interference between different
states. It also required members to operate in a
manner that would not cause harmful interference
to another state’s telecommunications.49 In
another instance, the Outer Space Treaty (OST)
assigned states international responsibility for
national activities in outer space (Article VI).
Since states are responsible for any interference to
another state’s space assets, they have incentive to
regulate private entities within their jurisdiction.
These regulatory regimes are intended to meet
states’ international legal liability obligations, not
to facilitate business interests. Just as deterrence
constraints only are effective if they are reciprocal
among all major actors, 50 commercial agreements
and regulations must also be mutually enforceable.
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In the SDA, the legal agreements are enforceable
against all members of the SDA, in accordance
with the domestic laws of the Isle of Man (where
the SDA was established as a legal entity). This is
consistent with current business practices and
international laws. Like deterrence, some business
norms and dispute resolution processes discourage
bad actions with the threat of punishment.
However, that punishment is by way of a financial
penalty rather than forceful retaliation. Unlike
deterrence, part of the goal of dispute resolution is
to compensate the injured party as well as to
punish the acting party. Also of note, under
business practices, intent to harm does not always
matter. Specific action, whether intentional or not,
can be penalized. Therefore, financial penalties
for both intentional and unintentional harm should
create greater incentives to prevent accidental
interference. That is an important aspect, since
classic deterrence is not designed to discourage
accidental behavior. Additionally, a company
may be penalized for each instance of interference
or may be repeatedly penalized for harmful
activities. In this case, interference is treated as a
private, individual issue rather than a state,
security issue.
Much attention has been focused on the space
treaties and their lack of enforcement
mechanisms. 51 Many have called for creating new
treaties or amending the current treaties. Others
advocate a supranational organization with fully
enforceable, absolute, legal authority over space
activities. 52 Even if a supranational organization is
the desired state, it will take significant time and
significant changes in attitude before that occurs.
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Moving toward using already existing
international commercial and contract
enforcement mechanisms provides an alternative
to the ineffectual space treaties but does not move
toward a supranational, enforcement mechanism
advocated by some 53 or toward less state-oriented
sovereignty. 54 Although space treaties are
generally considered ineffective at enforcing their
provisions, they do recognize the importance of
space and activities conducted in space. The
treaties do not determine whether activities are for
national security, civil, or commercial purposes.
They simply require space activities to be for
peaceful purposes. Although that provides a great
deal of flexibility it can also cause complications
since the same space assets may be dual use and
used for both state and commercial purposes.
Many of the proposed treaties or amendments to
current treaties focus on state liability obligations.
However, Julian Hermida points out that current
international space treaties and conventions are
“not all together responsive to the needs of the
private sector, especially with respect to the
impossibility of making direct claims for
compensation under the Liability Convention…”55
Given the dual use nature of most space assets, a
non-state, business avenue that provides for
compensation seems called for.
It is possible the Liability Convention provides an
initial avenue that does meet the needs of the
private sector. Under Articles II and XI of the
Liability Convention, a launching state is liable to
pay compensation for damage caused by its space
object [emphasis added]. 56 The Convention
allows for establishing a claims commission to
determine the specific compensation to be paid. It
also acknowledges a state’s right to pursue a claim
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Convention on the International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 24 usT 2380, TIAS
7762,961 UNTS 187, 29 March 1972.

in a launching state’s courts, administrative
tribunals, or agencies of that state. 57
In 1982 a UN General Assembly Resolution,
recognizing the significant impact of direct
broadcasting via satellite systems, also recognized
that domestic entities acting under the state’s
jurisdiction might be primarily involved rather
than the state itself.58 The state does not have to
be the primary participant in dispute resolution as
would be the case under the space treaties. More
specifically, the 2006 Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of other States specifically allows
non-state parties into the dispute resolution
process. 59 In order to take advantage of that,
judgments and financial penalties must be
enforceable across the states. Fortunately there
are a number of international conventions and
treaties that recognize the validity of domestic
judgments and facilitate their enforcement
internationally. 60
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and arbitration of investment disputes between
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting
States.”
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There are two types of activities that interfere with
the information transported via satellite. In the
first case a contract may be breached; in the
second a tort may have been conducted. (A tort is
a wrongful action that results in the harm to
another’s person or property and for which a
remedy may be obtained.) Determining whether
an action is a breach of contract or a tort is
important when deciding which international
business mechanisms to use.
If the dispute is contractual and the parties to the
contract have agreed to an arbitration clause then
the matter is rather straightforward. Per the clause
in the contract, the dispute is arbitrated in
accordance with agreed upon rules of procedure,
choice of law and by an agreed upon arbiter.
Furthermore, parties agree the results are binding
and awards from arbitration are enforceable
between the parties. Arbitration is typically used
in commercial contracts since it is generally
considered to more efficient, confidential, and less
expensive than litigation.61 When parties agree to
arbitration they give up their right to litigate in a
state’s legal system, 62 but this may not be desired
Broadcasting, 1982, General Assembly Resolution
37/92, UN Docs. A/RES/37/92 a.
61
Joseph Lookofsky and Ketilbjorn Hertz, EU-PIL
European Union Private International Law in Contract
and Tort, (Copenhagen:DJOF Publishing, 2009), 160.
62
Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473us 614
(1985). A Japanese corporation that manufactured
automobiles entered into a distribution and sales
agreement with a Puerto Rico corporation. The
agreement contained a clause providing for arbitration
by the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association for
all disputes arising out of certain articles of the
agreement or the breach thereof. The Japanese
corporation then brought an action in U.S. Federal
District Court under the Federal Arbitration Act and
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, seeking to compel arbitration
of the disputes in accordance with the arbitration
clause. The Puerto Rico corporation claimed that the
federal antitrust issues raised in the case were
inappropriate for enforcement through arbitration. The
court held that the antitrust claims were arbitrable
stating : “Concerns of international comity, respect for
the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals,
and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution
of disputes, all require enforcement of the arbitration
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if there is little established law that pertains to the
potential issues.
A drawback to arbitration is that the parties must
have had the foresight to draft an appropriate
arbitration clause to address an anticipated dispute.
Foresight could be based on current laws and
norms or might be based on some new or
controversial issue. For example, the SDA might
have had reason to insert an arbitration clause into
its membership contract. That contract addresses
misuse of members’ data and allows members to
enforce the terms of the contract directly against
other members. It would not be unreasonable for
the parties to insert an arbitration clause. Such an
arbitration clause might require disputes via
arbitration rather than via a particular state’s legal
system. In this case, resolving disputes via an
arbitration clause could set precedence. Since
arbitration results are binding and awards are
enforceable, actors considering similar future
actions could be dissuaded from taking those
actions.
Although the SDA provides an example to
examine the merits of arbitration, it does not
provide a good example for examining the merits
of litigation. However a context in which to
examine litigation can be found in a case of
intentional interference already observed. In 2010
Iran intentionally interfered with Voice of
America broadcasts and collaterally interfered
with the British BBC, German Deutche Welle and
Eutelsat, stopping television and radio
broadcasts. 63 The harm done by Iran clearly
impacted more than just one state. The VOA,
BBC, and Deutche Welle issued a joint statement
condemning the action, pointing out Iranian
authorities "are using the same satellite services to
broadcast freely around the world including
broadcasts in English and Arabic…” Had they
chosen to, they could have brought suit against
Iran.
Tort actions may be pursued through a state’s
domestic court system. Litigation is more
clause in question even assuming that a contrary result
would be forthcoming in a domestic context.”
63
“Voice of America, “EU Confronts Iran on Satellite
Jamming,” March 18 2010,
http://m.voanews.com/a/169839.html.
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complicated than arbitration since there is no
agreed upon course of action and no agreed upon
jurisdiction. An essential, but complicating,
element of litigation is determining which state
has jurisdiction over a dispute. Since domestic
law varies from state to state, parties try to litigate
their disputes in the jurisdictions with the laws
most favorable to them. Jurisdiction is typically
determined in three ways.
In the first, lex loci delicti commissi, jurisdiction is
determined by where the harmful action (tort)
occurred. 64 This could be problematic if the
harmful action took place in space since, under
the OST, there are no sovereignty claims to space
itself. If the tort was conducted from the earth,
then jurisdiction would be in the state where the
interference was conducted. In the case of Iran’s
interference with Eutelsat’s Hot Bird 8 satellite,
jurisdiction would be in Iran. The second way to
determine jurisdiction, lex loci damni, is
determined by where the harm was experienced.65
Depending on interpretation of the facts, one
could argue the harm was done to a satellite in
orbit. Since states claim jurisdiction over their
satellites in accordance with the OST,66
jurisdiction would then be in the state with
jurisdiction and control of the satellite.
Alternatively, the harm suffered could be
considered to be in any state where information
was disrupted. When Iran interfered with Hot
Bird 8, the United States, Great Britain, and
Germany all experienced disruption of their data.
All three could therefore claim jurisdiction. In the
third case, jurisdiction is based on the degree of

64
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66
Outer Space Treaty, Article VIII.

connection to the laws of the states.67 In this case,
since Eutelsat is based out of Paris France, one
could argue that French jurisdiction should
apply. 68 One could also argue that Italian
jurisdiction should apply since Eutelsat has
teleports in Italy.
It is a given that forecasting arbitration clauses to
include in a contract is difficult. It is also very
complicated and difficult to determine the
jurisdiction to pursue a cause of action. However,
since awards from arbitration 69 and judgments
from domestic courts are enforceable,70 the
difficulty may be worthwhile. Awards or
judgments from these venues seem to offer
another set of actions that might help discourage
interference with satellites. However, just as in
deterrence, an actor such as North Korea with
little to lose in the way of space assets or finances
may very well not be dissuaded from interfering
with a satellite. Financial penalties, enforceable
across the states, might provide incentives to
reconsider harmful interference with a satellite,
lest they are similarly penalized. Also, litigation
proceedings tend to be open to the public, and
could focus unwanted attention on an actor.
Finally, bad actors might have an incentive to
refrain from interfering with space capabilities if
67
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they believe they might be refused service or
might be charged higher prices due to their past
behavior that has required a provider to pay a
penalty. Additionally, a state would not face a
potentially unfavorable precedence in
interpretation of one of the space treaties. Those
two factors might make a state more willing to use
the dispute resolution processes - especially if a
state considers litigation and penalties a relative
threat to its national security. In combination with
deterrence actions, using the dispute resolution
process could be a more effective way to
discourage interference with commercial space
capabilities.

Conclusion
Classic deterrence strategy as developed
during the Cold War seems insufficient when
applied to the current multipolar space
environment. There are too many actors to

38

consider when conducting deterrence calculations,
and many of those actors are non-state,
commercial entities. Very often the relationships
between the states and the commercial providers
are extremely entangled, and space capabilities
have become largely dual use. Deterrence relies
on force and was developed to dissuade states
from acting in an unwanted manner and is largely
insufficient to address business concerns.
Given the current complex environment, it seems
an opportune time to explore additional avenues
that might complement deterrent actions. Using
commercial dispute resolution processes could
create pressures to dissuade interference with
space capabilities. In conjunction with deterrence
actions, legal measures could create a more secure
environment in which to operate space assets.
This, most importantly, could in turn provide
more protection for the valuable information
carried via those space assets.

Article

Identifying America’s Vital Interests
Adam Lowther
Casey Lucius
As the Department of Defense (DoD)
continues to shift its focus from Europe to the
Asia-Pacific while also attempting to meet
budgetary challenges, academics and analysts are
examining the nation’s difficult financial outlook
and contemplating not only the kind of military
the United States needs, but the kind it can
afford. 1 Such considerations are, however, putting
the cart before the horse. A much more basic
challenge faces the country. Simply stated, the
United States has no clearly defined and broadly
accepted set of national interests. Instead, as one
report noted, “Many find it difficult to distinguish
between America’s national interests and
whatever interests them personally.” 2 The call for
clearly defined national interests has been a
refrain of military and civilian leaders for many
years and yet the lack of clearly articulated
national interests has proven the bane of
Republican and Democratic administrations. In
1947, George Kennan advised President Truman
to distinguish between vital and peripheral
interests. Kennan insisted that interests be used as
the standard by which to evaluate threats, not the
other way around. He argued that threats had no
meaning unless in reference to interests. 3
This article, rather than testing an existing theory
or developing a new theory, focuses on a large
policy issue that, in our view, has received too
1
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3
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Critical Appraisal of American National Security
Policy During the Cold War (Oxford University Press,
2005), 31.

little attention in the post-Cold War years—
resulting in a poorly understood and defined
concept of what is “the national interest.” In
arguing for a broader discussion of American
interests, we suggest that it is time for the
American people and their leaders to engage in an
open dialogue that focuses attention on interests
and values so that the country may reach a
consensus, or as close to one as possible,
concerning what comprises the United States’
national interest. In doing so, it may be possible to
provide decision-makers a clearly delineated set
of preferences when evaluating possible foreign
policy decisions.
The nation’s strategic documents offer little
clarification as to the composition of the national
interest. The latest National Security Strategy
(2010) is a case in point. It says,
American interests are enduring. They are:
The security of the United States, its citizens, and
U.S. allies and partners; A strong, innovative, and
growing U.S. economy in an open international
economic system that promotes opportunity and
prosperity; Respect for universal values at home
and around the world; and An international order
advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace,
security, and opportunity through stronger
cooperation to meet global challenges.4
The National Security Strategy is a broad
document that represents an administration’s view
of the challenges facing the nation and its
approach to addressing those challenges. It is
fundamentally a political document of limited
value in understanding American grand strategy. 5
4

Barack Obama, National Security Strategy
(Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 7.
5
Although not specifically defined in formal
government publications, grand strategy may best be
thought of as the developing, applying, and
coordinating of the instruments of national power to
achieve objectives that contribute to national
security—a concept derived from several definitions in
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This shortcoming is unfortunate, because a lack of
a clearly defined set of interests makes it difficult
to craft an effective grand strategy that links
national policy to all elements of national
power—in order to secure the nation’s interests
and objectives. Grand strategy can also refer to
the nation’s overarching approach to international
affairs such as isolationism, collective security,
selective engagement, primacy, and so forth.
Strategy implies a goal or goals, and establishes
priorities. It is the role of policy makers to set
goals, and in some cases these goals can limit
strategic alternatives. In the 2010 NSS, readers
should be able to identify how the President
understands national interests in relation to
security, and how he will prioritize and protect
these interests.
Unfortunately, the description of the nation’s
interests provided above is vague and serves
limited utility in creating a clear understanding of
what matters most to the United States and its
citizens. American citizens deserve to know who
we are, what we stand for, and why we undertake
the policies we do. Planners, strategists, scholars,
and military leaders are eager for such clarity,
which does not exist currently. Such is necessary
for the development of foreign policy and military
strategy that are effective in protecting what
matters most to the nation.
CONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL
INTEREST
If, as is suggested, the lack of a clearly
defined set of national interests has made it
difficult to develop effective foreign policy, a
central question must be addressed; what are the
nation’s vital interests? Addressing a second
question is also instructive; how should the
nation’s vital interests be determined? In
answering both of these questions, the remainder
of this article advances a framework for
understanding the key concepts under
examination and offers an initial construction of
vital American interests. After completing our
analysis, it became clear that a robust dialogue
between the American people and their elected
the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms.
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leaders is necessary if the nation is to successfully
develop a widely accepted understanding of
national interests.
As the former Commission on America’s National
Interest wrote more than a decade ago, “For the
decade ahead, the only sound foundation for a
coherent, sustainable American foreign policy is a
clear public sense of American interests.” That
understanding is as important in a postIraq/Afghanistan era as it was in a post-Cold War
era. Further, in advocating the development of a
clear and consistent set of national interests that
transcends administrations, the desire is to create a
forcing function that makes it more difficult for
presidential administrations to pursue foreign
policies that stray beyond the nation’s identified
interests. While some may disagree with efforts to
constrain a president’s freedom of action in
foreign policy or view such efforts as overly
idealistic, setting a higher bar for presidents,
before they exercise American power abroad, is
consistent with congressional and constitutional
intent and should be palatable to Americans
across the political spectrum. 6
To achieve such an objective, identifying the
nation’s vital, major, and peripheral interests is
central. The first step in such a process is offered
by presenting a review of historical approaches to
foreign policy development and international
relations theory. Second, we offer to open the
dialogue advocated by presenting six vital
national interests that are likely to drive future
foreign policy. In doing so, we argue for a
transition from a value-focused foreign policy to
an interest-focused foreign policy. Such a
transition will provide the president and Congress
with a clear set of enduring interests around which
to build a stable foreign policy. Before continuing,
6

While there are certainly varying interpretations of
the U.S. Constitution, the powers of Congress,
enumerated in Article I, and the powers of the
president, enumerated in Article II, were originally
designed to create a more limited role for the executive
in foreign policy. With the War Powers Act serving as
an example of congressional effort to constrain the
president’s ability to use military power, it is clear that
new efforts to constrain the executive branch’s use of
American power abroad are not without historical
precedent.
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it is important to clarify that our conception of
“enduring vital interests” does not preclude vital
interests from evolving over time. Rather, the
term is used to underscore the relative stability
and often gradual change that occurs to the
nation’s interests as technological development
occurs and the United States grows and changes.
Admittedly, an interest focused foreign policy will
constrain the aspirations of presidents on the left
and right, but at a time when the nation is facing
great economic and strategic challenges, it may be
time to set aspirational goals aside and follow
former Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s axiom.
When asked why the United States was working
with Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, Hull
reportedly quipped, “He may be a son-of-a-bitch,
but he’s our son-of-a-bitch.” 7 In short, it may be
time for values to take a backseat to cold, hard
interests.
Methodology
Given this article’s objective of providing
useful policy guidance, Richard Kugler’s, Policy
Analysis in National Security Affairs: New
Methods for a New Era, provides a rigorous
method for framing and analyzing policy oriented
national security challenges. 8 While not
appropriate for theory generation or testing,
Kugler’s approach provides researchers a means
to identify interests, goals, and policy options.
The first step in employing Kugler’s methodology
requires the researcher determine whether the
policy problem under examination is strategic,
systemic (systems analysis), or operational
(operational research) in nature. 9 We determined
the problem discussed here to be strategic in
nature, thus Kugler’s process of “strategic
evaluation” is utilized. Broadly, this approach
assists in determining American interests and how
they are affected; strategic goals (desired endstate); and available policy options.
7
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The second step focuses on developing an
analytical framework. For this purpose, Kugler
provides a set of twenty-five framing questions
that should be answered before completing the
analysis and selecting a policy recommendation.
They include such questions as; what are the
expected effectiveness, benefits, and losses? What
assumptions, uncertainties, and biases may affect
the selected policy recommendation? What
tradeoffs are made in the selection of a policy
recommendation? 10 In answering each question, a
more complete understanding of the variables at
play is developed and the strengths and
weaknesses of possible policy options come to
light. As Kugler notes, “The analysis should begin
by describing each option, including its rationale,
aims, actions, and implementation strategy.” 11 The
analysis then concludes with an appraisal of the
likely effectiveness of the policy option
recommended.
Step three focuses on the dissemination of the
final product, which Kugler includes in his
methodology because he considers this aspect of
policy analysis is given short shrift all too often.
Thus, he provides a more rigorous approach to
determining how best to develop and present
analytical results. For our purposes, steps one and
two were of greatest utility. Kugler’s approach
increased the rigor of this study and ensured a
more comprehensive analysis of the affect
potential variables could have on a policy
recommendation. For the sake of clarity and
succinctness, we do not discuss each of Kugler’s
framing questions in the analysis. Rather we focus
on the results of the larger analytical process and
policy recommendations. Kugler’s approach does,
however, leave room for further analysis of the six
vital interests described below.
Building on Previous Conceptions of the
National Interest
The literature on national interests is
extensive and includes early classics from
Morgenthau, Kennan, and Lippman, to more
modern work from Steel, Waltz, Nye, and Jervis.
10
11
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This section will provide a brief review of the
national interest literature and identify how this
article contributes to the discourse on this
important topic.
The most famous work on the national interest
was generated by Hans Morgenthau in the early
1950s. His theory of political realism defines
national interests in terms of power. Morgenthau
suggested that interest is the essence of politics
and should be unaffected by the circumstances of
time and place. 12 His In Defense of the National
Interest (1951) argued that the national interest
must be the ultimate standard for developing
policy. Morgenthau also took the opportunity to
divorce morality from political action, suggesting
that moral principles in the international sphere
have no concrete universal meaning. 13 He
encouraged statesmen to “distinguish with
Lincoln between their ‘official duty,’ which is to
think and act in terms of the national interest, and
their ‘personal wish,’ which is to see their own
moral values and political principles realized
throughout the world.” 14
In 1977, Morgenthau took up the topic again in,
“Defining the National Interest–Again: Old
Superstitions, New Realities.” Clearly frustrated
by the partisan nature of politics, Morgenthau
highlighted that the national interest must not be
defined by the whim of a man or the partisanship
of party, but rather must rest on an objective view
and a rational application of foreign policy. He
cited the Monroe Doctrine and the European and
Asian balances of power as having guided U.S.
foreign policy since the nation’s existence, and he
encouraged political leaders to stay true to the
realist path. Morgenthau warned that without
consistency in American foreign policy, U.S.
decision makers will simply demonize the enemy
rather than recognize the real threat and the state’s
real power. He also cautioned political leaders not
to allow U.S. foreign policy to be determined by
Soviet foreign policy, or any other nation or
12

Hans Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth Thompson,
Politics Among Nations: The Struggles for Power and
Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985), 10.
13
From In Defense of the National Interest (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), chapters 1 and 8.
14
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 7.

42

movement for that matter—opposing a reactive
foreign policy. 15 Morgenthau was careful to
distinguish between political power and the use of
force. He explained that an economic, territorial,
or military policy may be undertaken for its own
sake, because there are economic, territorial, or
military advantages, but it is also possible that
such policies would be pursued because they
increase the power of the nation. In the
development of foreign policy, what should be
considered, Morgenthau argued, is the effect
policies have on the power of the nation. 16
George Kennan, like Morgenthau was a political
realist. He believed in asking critical questions
about U.S. intervention into world affairs and he
encouraged decision makers to focus primarily on
national interests. Kennan, through a series of
essays, books, and lectures examined the political
and intellectual motivations of American foreign
policy. He concluded that when it came to U.S.
intervention and war in particular, there lacked
real deliberation and discussion of national
interests. Speaking of the Spanish-American War,
he noted, “As for the manner in which we
employed our armed forces once we had launched
ourselves in that war, I found that we were guided
not by any very thoughtful concept of what it was
we wanted to achieve, and why, but rather by
popular moods, political pressures, and innergovernmental intrigue.” 17 Kennan acknowledged
that in other interactions, especially with China
and Japan, the United States tried to apply its own
legal and moral standards rather than searching
for a stable balance of power among the forces
active in the region.
Kennan, like Morgenthau, argued for the need to
separate morality from national interest,
suggesting that World War I was a great moral
cause in which the United States should not have
been involved. 18 Kennan was also critical of U.S.
15
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intervention in the Second World War, the Korean
War, and the Vietnam War. While Morgenthau
emphasized America’s demonological approach to
foreign policy, Kennan supported that notion by
highlighting America’s need to search at all times
for a single external center of evil, to which all
our trouble could be attributed.19
In 1985 Kennan wrote in Foreign Affairs to
clarify his position on national interests. He
suggested the interests with which governments
have to concern themselves are those of military
security, the integrity of political life, and the
well-being of the people. 20 Kennan was explicit
that American interests must be distinct from
political tastes. He reminded readers, just as he
had advised previous presidents, that effectively
using resources is also in America’s interest, and
it is essential to recognize the nation’s limited
resources and limited military power. Kennan
argued that the United States should only interfere
in the internal workings of other countries under
two conditions: 1) if it is in our national interest,
and 2) if we have the means to successfully
intervene and we can afford the costs. Kennan
was clear that foreign policy should be a reflection
of U.S. national interests. 21
Although less influential than Morgenthau and
Kennan, Walter Lippman was one of the earliest
to discuss these issues in U.S. Foreign Policy:
Shield of the Republic (1943), which highlighted
the need to return to the fundamental principle of
foreign policy. He described this principle as
bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus
of power, the nation’s commitments and the
nation’s power. 22 Morgenthau and Kennan later
called this simply “balance of power.” Lippman
argued that, from 1898 until his book was
published, the United States chose a set of ideals
over national security. He spoke to the ideals of
disarmament and collective security, which
19
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detracted from our most vital interest: national
security. 23
Lippman argued that the United States should not
strive to achieve peace, but should instead focus
on independence and security. He wrote, “A
nation has security when it does not have to
sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is
able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.” 24
Lippman rejected the Wilsonian notion of
collective security because it assumed a certain
unity among unequal states rather than accepting
the evolution of a union from a nucleus of firmly
allied strong states. 25 He charged that Wilson was
trying to establish collective security without
forming an alliance. Lippman concluded that from
1898 to 1941 the United States engaged in three
wars without ever having formed a real foreign
policy. He reminded readers that the measure of a
policy is its soundness; if it is sound, it will prove
acceptable to the American people. 26
In defining vital national interests, Lippman stated
clearly that the American people will fight and
give their lives for what they regard as vital
interests. The defense of American territory
against foreign powers is an interest that has
become nationally accepted, according to
Lippman, and we need not make any apologies
when putting this vital interest first. 27 In fact,
Lippman argued that our allies and partners would
benefit from an American foreign policy founded
on our own national interests.
Lippman, Kennan, and Morgenthau were clear
realists, and this article advocates a realignment of
U.S. foreign policy and realist thinking. However,
there are many authors who make strong and
cogent arguments on this topic although it is not
always clear as to which school of thought they
belong. Somewhere between realism and
liberalism is Samuel Huntington. He advocated
the balance of power, national security, and an
emphasis on interests, but he also left room for
social and economic issues to influence foreign
23
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policy. Huntington, unlike Morgenthau and
Kennan, did not separate national interests and
morality. Instead he understood national interests
as a combination of security and material
concerns on the one hand, and moral and ethical
concerns on the other. Huntington explained that
it is American identity and values that drives the
use of and provides a purpose for American power.
Huntington described a set of ideals and principles
stemming from America’s founding documents,
which included liberty, equality, democracy,
constitutionalism, liberalism, and limited
government. 28
While Huntington was open to including ideals in
U.S. foreign policy, he also argued that American
policy had been unduly influenced by economic
and ethnic considerations. He admitted that ethnic
groups have played active roles in politics
throughout American history, also promoting
American interests outside the United States.
Huntington referenced former Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger who, at a 1997 Center
for Strategic and International Studies lecture,
said, “The United States has less of a foreign
policy in a traditional sense of a great power than
we have the stapling together of a series of goals
put forth by domestic constituency groups….the
result is that American foreign policy is
incoherent.” 29 Huntington called this “the
domestication of foreign policy.” While foreign
policy should be driven by the interests of the
state in a world of competing states, instead he
suggested it is driven by economic and ethnic
interests in American domestic politics.
Similarly, Robert Jervis also notes that the most
vital interest of any country is security from
invasion or attack. He argues that the second most
vital interest is the ability to protect the state’s
closest allies, and a third interest is in economic
prosperity. 30 Jervis acknowledges that there is
always agreement that the protection of the
28
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country comes first, but after that, consensus
breaks down. 31 He makes the case that in the
United States, foreign policy is heavily influenced
by domestic economics, American democratic
values, and ethnic considerations. Jervis admits
that because the United States has a fragmented
political system, no single interest, threat, or value
will dominate the development of foreign policy.
Alternatives to Classical Realism
Another author of national interest who
falls into the liberalism school of thought is
Joseph Nye. He writes, “In a democracy, the
national interest is simply the set of shared
priorities regarding relations with the rest of the
world. It is broader than strategic interests,
though they are part of it. It can include values
such as human rights and democracy, if the public
feels that those values are so important to its
identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote
them.” 32 Nye also admits that the United States
has an interest in maintaining international order.
He notes that Americans want to influence distant
governments and organizations on a variety of
issues and, to do this, it needs hard power
resources. While he recognizes the need to call
upon the military to protect national interests, he
also comingles interests and values. Nye argues
that Americans want to see strong moral
preferences in their foreign policy, which is why it
has become acceptable to use the American
military to support humanitarian interests
abroad. 33
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Authors such as Ronald Steel point out that other
elements including resource scarcity, population
growth, urbanization, mass migration,
environmental degradation, terrorism, and
economic exploitation can and do threaten
national security. He argues that there are interests
impervious to borders, and therefore, we must be
careful about devising policy based solely on a
defined national interest.34 Steel argues that the
problem with realist notions of national security is
that they assume that states are the primary actors
which both provide security and threaten security.
Instead, he promotes what he calls a new kind of
realism. Steel identifies vital, secondary, and
tertiary American interests, and submits that U.S.
policy should primarily serve to protect the
American homeland from destruction and
preserve U.S. institutions and a democratic form
of government, while still recognizing the various
other elements that can impact policy making. 35
Like Steel, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz
explain that states are not the only actors in the
international system, and therefore developing
foreign policy cannot be as simple as identifying a
clear list of national interests that support the
security of the state. Neorealists, liberals,
constructivists, and radicals all accept other actors
as playing an important role in foreign policy
development. For neorealists like Waltz, however,
the most important unit to analyze is the structure
of the international system, namely the absence of
overarching authority, and the distribution of
capabilities among states.
Both realists and neorealists share the core
principle of balance of power, but neorealists
advance the idea that the balance of power is
largely determined by the structure of the
system. 36 Waltz accepts the idea of balance of
power, but admits that it does not serve to explain
the particulars of a state or its policies. He spends
a great deal of time studying the roles of human
behavior, society, the structure of states, and
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emotion in international relations.37 Waltz points
out the hitch between national politics and the
international political system, writing that national
politics is consumed with authority,
administration, and laws while international
politics focuses on power, struggle, and
accommodation. 38 Those statesmen charged with
developing foreign policy must reconcile these
differences to bring together the interests of the
state within an international framework.
Those authors who fall into a liberal school of
international relations leave room for new actors
like multinational corporations, non-governmental
organizations, and social groups to influence the
making of foreign policy. Within international
relations liberalism, there is also a growing view
that not only do international organizations play
an important role in establishing international
norms and promoting peace, as Immanuel Kant
theorized in the eighteenth century, but that
democracies do not fight one another, thus the
promotion of democracy and liberal values is
central to ensuring the perpetual peace Kant
sought. 39
While authors like Jervis and Huntington may
reject the basic premise of liberalism, they also
recognize that the variables examined by the
liberal school do influence the behavior of state
actors. Jervis even includes cognitive dissonance
as having a role in policy development, explaining
that once foreign policy is developed and
implemented; decision-makers will justify it even
if it means rearranging their beliefs to gain
increased support for the action taken.40 This leads
to inconsistency in policy and unpredictable
political calculations.
Constructivism differs in that it promotes a
normative view of national interests.
37
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Constructivists like Alexander Wendt, support the
promotion of democracy and human rights around
the world, but they also recognize that these are
ever-evolving concepts. For constructivists,
national interests are not consistent, but rather
they are social constructs that must be flexible to
changing identities. 41 Individual elites are also
important in constructivist thinking, assuming that
major shifts in policy can be driven by one or two
influential decision-makers, especially in times of
crisis or political instability.
In response to the wide spectrum of views counter
to classical realism, we argue that many of the
propositions advocated by liberals, constructivists,
and even neo-realists are both lofty and costly.
Rather, we advocate the adoption of policies that
take heed of the dangers authors like Lippman and
Kennan warned of and the need to clearly
articulate the nation’s interests—developing a
foreign policy that supports and protects those
interests. Further we advocate a path that moves
the United States away from the Wilsonian belief
that there is a moral imperative to aid in the
political regeneration of other nations.
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alliances of Europe.” 42 A policy of commercial
internationalism and military non-interventionism
served the philosophical standard, if not always
the operational standard, for American foreign
policy until the 20th century. 43 During the halfcentury long Cold War, two generations of
Americans grew to adulthood during a time in
which the United States maintained an average of
535,000 troops overseas—a decided departure
from Washington’s ideal. 44
With the Cold War’s end, President Bill Clinton
sought to redefine the national interest during the
1990s by combining commercial internationalism
with the spread of democracy and international
institutions. Many American troops returned to
the United States, and the nation’s reliance on
decisive military action declined. Much like the
approach to foreign policy and the national
interest prior to the Cold War, President Clinton
exploited the “peace dividend” and focused on
expanding America’s commercial ties and
influence. With what Francis Fukuyama described
as the “end of history,” liberal internationalism
attempted to unseat realism from its perch atop the
foreign policy hierarchy.

ENDURING VITAL INTERESTS
The American approach to foreign policy
and national interest has shifted greatly from the
nation’s founding to the present. When President
George Washington published his farewell
address on 17 September 1796, he laid out a
concept of foreign policy designed to preserve the
national interest. Washington’s recognition of
interstate commerce’s importance is exemplified
in his famous statement: “The great rule of
conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in
extending our commercial relations, to have with
them as little political connection as possible. So
far as we have already formed engagements, let
them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let
us stop.” He went on to add that the United States
should be a “friend to all and enemy of none” as
the nation sought to “avoid the entangling
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Like his predecessor, George W. Bush was from
the liberal internationalist school of thought.
Where President Clinton sought to make the
world safe for democracy through globalization,
President Bush arguably sought to achieve similar
objectives through the imposition of democracy.
And with the United States exiting Iraq and
Afghanistan while also undertaking an AsiaPacific pivot, few are attempting to frame the
debate surrounding these conflicts within the
context of a well-defined national interest.
Contrary to the view of Joseph Nye, who argues
that the national interest is, “simply what citizens,
42
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after proper deliberation, say it is;”45 we suggest
the national interest and the interests (vital, major,
and peripheral) that comprise it have developed
over many years and endure across Republican
and Democratic administrations. The national
interest is not defined by a sitting president’s
political agenda. It transcends short-term political
objectives. In order to provide greater clarity as to
the composition of the national interest, the
following pages define the concept and offer a
detailed examination of America’s vital
interests. 46
Levels of Interests
While there are alternative conceptions of
the national interest, Dennis Drew and Donald
Snow offer a straightforward explanation of the
concept. 47 They suggest the national interest has
three components: vital, major, and peripheral
interests. They define a vital interest by two basic
characteristics. First, compromise of a vital
interest is unacceptable to the state. Second, the
resort to war is a legitimate, and likely, action in
the defense of a vital interest.48 Huntington held a
similar view defining a vital interest as one that is
worth expending “blood and treasure.” 49 As James
Thomson suggests, “Vital interests arise from an
enduring combination of the nation’s geographic
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position, political culture, economy, and power.”50
A third characteristic of vital interests is
continuity over time. Rarely does a vital interest
develop overnight nor is it common for the nature
of a vital interest to fluctuate significantly. More
commonly, interests are constant and enduring in
their importance to the nation.
Historically, preservation of the nation’s
commercial interests was seen as the sine qua non
of vital interests because they were and are the
foundation for economic prosperity, which serves
as the foundation of the nation’s military strength.
However, territorial integrity rose to prominence
during the Cold War as the fear of nuclear war
captured the national conscience. In the
generation since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the United States has found no peer competitor
capable of challenging its vital commercial or
territorial interests. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq
posed an existential threat to the United States,
just as al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain limited in
their ability to threaten the nation and its citizens.
Thus, the debate over vital interests has strayed
beyond its traditional bounds.
Major and peripheral interests do not require a
state to resort to war if threatened. Here an interest
involves a situation where “a country’s political,
economic, or social well-being may be adversely
affected but where the use of armed force is
deemed excessive to avoid adverse outcomes.” 51
Many interests fall into these two categories and
can be addressed in a number of ways. The United
States frequently employs diplomatic and
economic tools to secure its major and peripheral
interests. Without identifying the nation’s vital
interests, we have no way of knowing when or
how the nation should respond, and strategists and
policy makers are forced to choose between action
or inaction as options to declare what is important
to national security.
Clarity, in many instances, only comes when an
adversary acts provocatively, forcing decision50
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makers to weigh the costs and benefits of possible
actions. For example, the American reaction to
human rights atrocities in Darfur is a typical
response to the violation of a peripheral interest.
Although the United States expressed strong
disapproval of what took place, neither the
president nor Congress undertook strong
economic sanctions or military action.52 Such acts
of inhumanity violate the cultural and moral
norms of Americans, but they do not offend the
nation enough to warrant a strong military
response.
Six Vital American Interests
After more than two centuries of
independence, the United States’ vital interests, in
our evaluation, have largely remained consistent
over long periods of time, with transformative
technologies serving as the single greatest reason
for change in American interests. In many
respects, two centuries of growth and change only
served to filter and clarify what is and is not in the
national interest. By reinforcing the enduring
nature of the nation’s interest, events such as
World War I & II, the Cold War, and the attacks
of September 11, 2001 have not fundamentally
reshaped what matters most. It is the propensity of
Americans and their leaders to forget what matters
that has long been the problem. What then are the
nation’s vital interests?
Trade and Economic Prosperity
Since the earliest days of the republic, commercial
or economic interests have never ceased to serve
as the lifeblood of the nation. Originally built on
the export of raw materials and the import of
manufactured goods, the United States was
successful because the nation focused almost
exclusively on economic growth. Challenges to
the nation’s commercial interests came first from
the Barbary Pirates and then from the British
Navy. 53 In both instances the nation went to war.
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Soon after entering the industrial age the United
States would become the world’s largest economy
and a net exporter—well before World War II.
During the twentieth century, the Soviet Union
presented the clearest threat to American
economic interests, as two competing economic
systems engaged in an epic struggle for
supremacy. 54 With the Soviet Union’s collapse,
capitalism prevailed. America’s “unipolar
moment” did not, however, completely shift the
focus from commercial interests.55 Since 1991
every national security strategy has devoted
significant discourse to the president’s grand
strategy for defense of the nation’s economic
interests—albeit through policies that often do not
survive to the succeeding administration.
Energy Supply
Some argue that the history of U.S. foreign
policy—since at least the Cold War—is the
history of America’s thirst for oil. 56 Although
meant as a condemnation of the American way of
life, it is a reality that the world—advanced and
developing—is dependent on hydrocarbons
derived from such sources as coal, natural gas,
and petroleum. 57 These resources drive the
economy and the American way of life. Cutting
the nation’s or its trading partner’s energy supply
would cause the economy to grind to a halt. No
other natural resource is as pervasive in its impact
on society.
While many Americans find the idea of waging
war to secure the nation’s energy supply
unacceptable, no president, Democrat or
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54
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Republican, is willing to place the nation’s energy
supply at risk. Few would disagree that the first
Gulf War sought to protect Middle East oil
supplies from an aggressive despot. 58 Some also
claim that the second Iraq war was a bolder
attempt to secure America’s oil supply. 59 What
most policy-makers will agree on is the
importance of hydrocarbons to the continued
success of the U.S. economy.

lines of commerce and communication enabled an
island nation (Britain) to become an empire. If
America were to take its rightful place among the
great powers, it too must master the seas. As
Mahan noted early in his work, “The profound
influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and
strength of countries was clearly seen long before
the true principles which governed its growth and
prosperity were detected.” 63

By 2030 global energy demand is estimated to be
50 percent higher than today. 60 Absent a
technological breakthrough in renewable energy, a
transformational increase in domestic drilling
(like hydraulic fracturing), or a turn to nuclear
power, energy will play an increasingly important
role in economic and security policy. The need for
critical resources has a long history of generating
conflicts. 61 Oil and natural gas have the greatest
potential to be the resources over which much
blood is spilled in the coming years. 62

In previous centuries, “supremacy” enabled
countries to restrict interstate commerce, but the
United States saw the benefits of open trade
enabled by secure trade routes. As the single
largest economy in the world for nearly a century,
no other nation has derived greater benefit from
the U.S. Navy’s maintenance of secure oceans.
With more than 6.76 billion tons of goods moving
by sea each year (90 percent of all interstate trade),
a loss of such freedom would adversely affect the
national interest in ways that are complex and
difficult to accurately calculate.64

Freedom of the Seas
In addition to economic and energy security,
freedom of movement is a vital national interest
and America’s military works to ensure freedom
of navigation, not just for the United States, but
for all nations. When Mahan wrote The Influence
of Sea Power upon History (1890), he was the
first to develop a unified thesis linking supremacy
of the seas to national greatness. His study of
British and French maritime strategy convinced
Mahan that Britain’s control of the transoceanic
58

William Head and Earl Tilford, eds., The Eagle in
the Desert: Looking Back on U. S. Involvement in the
Persian Gulf War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).
59
Stephen Pelletière, America’s Oil Wars (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2004); and Lawrence Kaplan and William
Kristol, The War over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and
America’s Mission (New York: Encounter Books,
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60
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Command, 2010), 24.
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Institute Press, 2011).

Freedom of action at sea also ensures that the
lines of communication remain open. Currently,
undersea cables carry more than seven trillion
bytes per second of information across more than
150,000 kilometers of fiber optic cable. 65 If they
were cut, the United States’ ability to
communicate and conduct commerce with the
world would be greatly degraded.
Over the next generation, trade will continue to
flow across oceans and undersea cables will
continue to carry large quantities of data. While
the United States’ relative position in the
international system is likely to decline as
countries such as China, India, and Brazil grow,
maintaining American freedom of action at sea
will remain a vital interest. Defending the global
63
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commons will not diminish in its importance to
the nation. 66

Space Access
The United States also seeks freedom of action in
space. A 2012 Department of Defense directive
correctly notes, “The sustainability and stability of
the space environment, as well as free access to
and use of space, are vital to U.S. national
interests.” 67 Space plays a critical role in
communications (strategic and commercial),
intelligence (imagery and electronic), navigation
(commercial and military), and early warning. 68
One recent look at a theoretical loss of
commercial and military access to space from
attack paints a plausible picture that demonstrates
the United States’ susceptibility to such an attack
and the devastation it could wreak. 69
The years and decades ahead will see spacerelated technology mature and spread, making
space accessible to friend and foe alike while also
increasing American reliance on space assets.
According to the 2011 National Security Space
Strategy, as many as 9,000 satellite
communications transponders are expected to be
in orbit by 2015. As the demand for bandwidth
increases and more transponders are placed in
service, there will be greater likelihood of radio
frequency interference and increased strain on
government resources to minimize that
66
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interference—along with potential threats posed
by adversaries. 70
Absent some unforeseen shift in policy and
technological development, the nation will
increasingly rely on space in the decades ahead. If
space is weaponized, as is frequently suggested, it
will play an even greater role in national
defense. 71 Thus, space is likely to increase rather
than decrease in its importance to the national
interest.
Cyber Security
Similarly, cyber security has grown over the past
sixty years from a new technology—with early
computers that helped the United States and
Britain decrypt Nazi messages—to what is
arguably the most pervasive and economically
relevant technology of the present and future.72
Thus, with its rise to prominence over the 20th and
early 21st centuries it is now possible to
definitively call cyber security a vital interest. In
its opening paragraph the Cyberspace Policy
Review (2009) notes, “The globally
interconnected digital information and
communications infrastructure known as
‘cyberspace’ underpins almost every facet of
modern society and provides critical support for
the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public
safety, and national security.” 73
As recently as a decade ago, suggesting that cyber
security was a vital interest would have drawn
harsh criticism. Technological developments,
however, have deepened the nation’s reliance on
cyberspace over that time. Currently, every
economic sector and government agency is
dependent on cyberspace for the transmission of
70
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data. 74 Disrupting that flow would have serious
consequences for the United States. As
technology advances in the coming years, cyberdependence will grow. Thus, maintaining freedom
of action in cyberspace is an increasingly
important vital interest, even as it illustrates
Huntington’s claim that specific interests do
indeed evolve and develop, with cyberspace
serving as the single best example of a rapid rise
in importance.
Homeland Security
With an exact definition of “homeland security”
remaining elusive as the Department of Homeland
Security and U.S. Northern Command engage in a
wide range of security and emergency
management activities, this is perhaps the most
amorphous and expansive vital interest. A look at
homeland security literature offers at least seven
definitions of the term, ranging from an emphasis
on terrorism to jurisdictional hazards to quality of
life. When fifty practitioners of homeland security
were asked what the term meant to them, 14
percent said “terrorism,” 18 percent said “all
hazards,” and 38 percent admitted that homeland
security is undefined. 75 While there is no
consensus on how homeland security is defined,
most Americans would likely agree that protection
of territorial sovereignty and integrity is indeed a
vital interest.
According to the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance, “U.S. forces will continue to defend
U.S. territory from direct attack by state and nonstate actors.” 76 In his 2010 National Security
Strategy, President Obama dedicates a section to
strengthening security and resilience at home and
74
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acknowledges he has no greater responsibility
than to protect the American people and the
homeland. 77 Similarly, the Department of
Homeland Security, which was established for
this very purpose, published a Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review in 2010, noting, “A
safe and secure homeland must mean more than
preventing terrorist attacks from being carried out.
It must also ensure that the liberties of all
Americans are assured, privacy is protected, and
the means by which we interchange with the
world—through travel, lawful immigration, trade,
commerce, and exchange—are secured. 78
Regardless of how it is defined, defense of the
homeland is the primary vital interest focused on
what Morgenthau considered the second area of
vital interest—sovereignty or territorial integrity.
The Role of Values in Foreign Policy
While we have argued for a shift away
from a values-based foreign policy, the role of
values in American political life is of great
significance. In the nation’s external actions, the
departments of State and Defense have long
sought to advance civil rights and liberties—a
laudable desire. In establishing the United States,
the Founding Fathers developed a model of
government that would guarantee liberty—a
central value at the founding—for the nation’s
citizens. Confident in the success of the American
experiment, President Eisenhower, on a world
goodwill tour in 1959, told the people of India,
“We believe freedom ultimately will be won
everywhere.” In Athens, he defined freedom as a
state “…in which, under the rule of law, every
human will have the right and a fair chance to live
his own life, to choose his own path, to work out
his own destiny.” 79
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Consistent with Eisenhower’s view of America’s
role in advancing liberty, we advocate a policy
where the United States serves primarily as a
“shining city upon a hill,” setting an example in
the exercise of virtue at home, rather than, as John
Quincy Adams warned against, going abroad
“…in search of monsters to destroy.” 80
Admittedly, much of U.S. foreign policy over the
past two decades has centered on maintaining a
liberal social order in parts of the world where
one-party regimes oppose liberal democratic ideas
and practices. Francis Fukuyama’s early thesis
centered on whether it was America’s proper task
to promote global democratization, that is, to
“make the world safe for democracy.” 81 Most
realists believe American foreign policy has been
prone to a naïve belief in American
“exceptionalism.” They suggest Lord Palmerston
offered sage and timeless advice when, in 1856,
he said of Britain, “We have no eternal allies, and
we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are
eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our
duty to follow.”
This is not to suggest that realists reject the role of
values. Morgenthau argued that the nation derives
its identity from its dedication to certain universal
truths about men, including respect for the
fundamental and natural liberties and rights
delineated in the Declaration of Independence.82
However, realists such as Morgenthau and
Kennan would argue that America’s foreign
policy and military intervention should not be
driven by attempts to promote global
democratization. Rather, they suggest that liberal
values and foreign policy can and should be
separated.
Post-Cold War presidential administrations,
Republican and Democrat, have developed
foreign policy based on a political tradition that
places emphasis on the defense of human liberty.
The current National Security Strategy states:
80

John Quincy Adams, Independence Day Address (4
July 1821).
81
Daniel Mahoney, “The Future of American Foreign
Policy,” in Peter Augustine Lawler and Robert Martin
Schaefer, eds., The American Experiment (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 332.
82
Ibid., 334-335.

52

The United States believes certain values
are universal and will work to promote
them worldwide. These include an
individual’s freedom to speak their mind,
assemble without fear, worship as they
please, and choose their own leaders; they
also include dignity, tolerance, and
equality among all people, and the fair
and equitable administration of justice.
The United States was founded upon a
belief in these values….And nations that
embrace these values for their citizens are
ultimately more successful–and friendly
to the United States – than those that do
not. 83
A wide acceptance among policy makers of the
“democratic peace theory” and empirical evidence
that democracies and countries with strong trade
relations do not fight one another has fostered a
renewed interest in the promotion of democracy,
liberal economic regimes, and globalization.84
Although the means by which the United States
furthers its promotion of liberal economic and
political systems will likely change in the decades
ahead, it will remain a priority for the nation. 85
While the post-Cold War period has seen a
significant move toward free markets and
democratic political systems, there is some reason
to believe that “autocratic capitalism” may
become more prominent in the decades ahead.
With political systems that are less free, these
regimes will maintain stronger control over their
populations while continuing to promote market
oriented policies. Not all scholars agree,
however. 86
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In the course of dialogue regarding the national
interest, it is important to remember the historical
debate surrounding distinctions between
American values versus vital interests, and the
benefits and dangers associated with developing
foreign policy and military strategy that focus on
amorphous values at the expense of concrete
interests. We argue American values present a
range of issues for governments to address, but
they do not necessarily represent America’s vital
national interests. It is the nation’s interest that
must drive foreign policy, not abstract notions of
values and morality, which clearly are defined
differently by different administrations.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
While some readers may question the
specific interests discussed above, they are likely
to agree that a vigorous debate concerning the
national interest is a necessary undertaking for a
free and open society. Although the National
Security Strategy purports to describe the national
interest, it is more accurately described as a
partisan political document designed to describe a
sitting president’s foreign policy agenda. To better
establish a broadly accepted conceptualization of
America’s national interest, we recommend the
President and Congress jointly re-establish a
Commission on America’s National Interests.
Much like the one established in 1996, it should
be composed of respected persons from both
political parties and with a diversity of experience.
Its purpose should be to reach a broad consensus
on the nation’s vital interests. While we have
suggested six vital interests in the preceding pages,
such a commission may develop an alternative set
of vital interests.
We also recommend a shift in the focus of
American foreign policy from one based on the
advancement of values to one based on the
advancement of concrete interests. Such a policy
would, in many ways, raise the bar for the use of
military force, much like the Weinberger-Powell
Doctrine was designed to do. The objective of
such a shift is both to de-politicize foreign policy
and ensure that American foreign policy is more
closely tied to the nation’s material interests.
Absent such an effort, American foreign policy
will continue to vacillate between presidential

administrations and serve as a point of division
amongst Americans.
We do not suggest that recommendations
provided here can be implemented merely through
a simple exercise to agree upon vital national
interests. One of the most daunting obstacles to
this undertaking will be accounting for
organizational interests. There are many agencies
and individuals within the federal government and
within society that prefer ambiguity on this topic.
Once the nation agrees upon a specific set of vital
interests and seeks to prioritize and protect those
interests, organizations and interests may see their
favored cause fall from prominence. Over the last
several decades, for example, the nation has seen
the growing role of cyberspace rise above other
interests in the level of resources dedicated toward
its protection. This is to be expected as the
nation’s interests slowly evolve over time. 87
Another challenge for any administration seeking
an interest-based approach to foreign policy is that
it serves to hold decision-makers accountable for
actions taken in the international arena.
Ambiguity not only serves organizational interests,
it can also serve personal political interests, giving
policy makers the flexibility to make popular
decisions on a whim, rather than making difficult,
consistent decisions that require thoughtful
deliberation and explanation. Nevertheless, we
continue to recommend that as a global leader and
representative democracy, America’s allies and
citizens deserve more than ambiguity and
populism. It is time for courageous leadership to
speak out on this important topic because the
choice between interests and values is great, but
the implications for the future of American
foreign policy are greater.
Finally, we acknowledge that while a clean list of
constant enduring vital interests is preferable,
there are also evolving interests that can develop
as a result of both technology and international
commitments. The important concept to
87
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remember in regard to such evolution of interests
is to anticipate and accept these new interests, not
because they have emerged from economic
benefit or popular opinion, but because the
nation’s own innovation has allowed for new
interests to develop. Similarly, some actions may
be driven by international treaties or allied
commitments, but these too must be approached
with thoughtful deliberation—with U.S. national
interests always in mind.
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It is essential for the United States to clearly
articulate its own vital interests in order to
continue to serve as a global leader. Such an
undertaking will serve both America’s allies and
the nation’s national security. If the United States
does not play this role, either because Americans
cannot reach a consensus or refuse to identify vital
national interests, other rising powers will step
into the void. It is very likely that Americans will
not like the results.
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The purpose of this study is twofold: first,
to determine to what extent multilateral
agreements to limit disruptive actions in space
and/or establish norms of behavior are verifiable;
second, to consider under what circumstances
space verification serves U.S. interests.
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly said, especially by
military spokesmen, that space is becoming more
congested, contested, and competitive. These
trends are predicted to have increasingly negative
consequences for national security. If this is the
case, three alternatives present themselves for
policy makers: do nothing, in which case the
negative trends presumably will continue until all
of space becomes more dangerous and some of it
un-useable; hope that a rough order emerges as
independent players attempt to maximize their
interests—an “invisible hand” solution; or take
positive steps to create order out of the emerging
chaos. This last alternative will probably require
that all major actors accept some inhibition on
freedom of action in space, as has been clear for
some time regarding mitigation of space debris.
In an increasingly congested and contested
environment, it may become true of other
activities as well. But no sovereign actor will
accept such limitations unless it can be assured of
the compliance of others. Hence, verification
becomes a key factor.
Definitions
Verification is any process designed to
demonstrate a party's compliance or noncompliance with an agreement or treaty. For our
purposes, verification is relevant to all agreements
that place constraints on specific and observable
actions in space or directed at space, including
deployment, testing and/or maneuvers of weapons
or other systems as well as physical or electromagnetic interference with the operation of

satellites. It therefore differs from monitoring,
which is the technical ability to observe activity.
Intentions are not verifiable, although an effective
verification regime can detect patterns of activity
from which intent may be inferred. The same is
true of unilateral declarations of good faith, best
behavior or resolve to promote various laudatory
outcomes in space. Multilateral agreement on
norms of behavior represents a gray area. Those
expectations that grow over time to create
political inhibitions against certain actions in
space may be a proper subject for verification, and
knowledge of behavior in space created by
verification regimes may help in building the case
that such norms exist. But this applies only to
norms against specific and observable behaviors
and may be more apparent than real. It can be
argued, for example, that a norm against kinetic
ASAT tests in space existed for more than two
decades after the mid-1980s, when both the U.S.
and the USSR ceased testing. As the Chinese
ASAT test of 2007 showed, however, one nation’s
norm may be another’s target of opportunity.
Verification does not apply to rogue actors whose
intent is to disrupt the system and whose actions
can only be monitored. A verifiable regime
among major actors does not, therefore, eliminate
the possibility of disruptive actions in space. It
does, however, create a common interest among
the most influential space powers to isolate
outliers and bring international pressure to bear
against such behavior.
Both arms control and verification of compliance
can contribute to strengthening deterrence, since
well-conceived measures make it more difficult
for an adversary to test and deploy offensive
weapon systems, and may enhance warning of
potential threat. It should be emphasized that
such measures limit behavior in peacetime, but
not in war. If deterrence fails, only those
agreements specifically applicable to hostilities
(like the Geneva and Hague Conventions)
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continue legally to apply. Accordingly, arms
control, norms, rules of the road and other
schemes to foster a stable and predictable
environment in space do not limit war-time
options, any more than laws of peaceful transit at
sea or in the air limit freedom of action if
hostilities occur.1
Premises
•

•

•

Any regime in space requiring U.S. selfrestraint can only be sustained politically
over time if the U.S. can be assured of the
compliance of others. This includes
systems of “norms,” “best practices,” and
“codes of conduct” as well as treaty
restraints.
Accordingly, U.S. policy on specific
proposals for normative measures in
space whether of the “hard” or “soft”
variety should be based from the outset on
consideration of whether or not
compliance can be verified within
reasonable limits.
No major space actor is likely to accept
meaningful constraints on its freedom of
action in space unless it can verify
independently the compliance of others.
The capability of verification by the least
capable major actor will therefore define
the limits of agreed constraints. 2

What are “reasonable limits”? All agree that
verification can never be exact. Even in the
1

On this point, see inter alia, Jonty Kasku-Jackson and
Elizabeth Waldrop, “Understanding Space Law,” in the
Eisenhower Center’s book, Space and Defense Policy,
(London: Routledge Publishing, 2009), p. 65.
2
Hays describes how nuclear limitations “could only
be as precise as could be ‘seen’ by national technical
means” in Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space:
Into the Twenty-First Century, INSS Occasional paper
#42, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,
September 2002), p. 57. Hence, according to Hays’
account, limitations of nuclear testing in space only
became possible with the deployment by the United
States of the Vela Hotel satellite series that allowed
such activity to be detected. The assertion here, in
short, is that neither the U.S. nor other major actors
would rely on data from potential adversaries affecting
real national security interest.
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absence of intention to evade (which cannot, of
course, be discounted) there can be noncompliance at the margins, viz., operator mistakes,
disputes about how agreements apply in particular
circumstances, 3 or ambiguity in the terms of the
agreements themselves. 4 Parties may push the
edges of the interpretive envelope or probe the
capabilities of the others’ sensors. The term of art
is “circumvention” and refers to “exploitation of
imprecise treaty language, loopholes, omissions or
ambiguities” that may have military significance.5
The question is: when does such behavior cross
the boundary from nuisance, or the normal friction
of competitive relationships, to become a concern
for national security?
For the purposes of this analysis, verification
within “reasonable limits” means the ability to
detect non-compliance that alters or might in
future alter the relative strategic position of the
United States in space, with sufficient warning
time to respond appropriately. This includes
restrictions on the orbiting of certain types of
satellites, the use of certain critical orbits, the
maneuvering of satellites, and the testing of either
ground based or space based ASAT capability.
A verification regime that met this standard might
not detect individual instances of non-compliant
behavior. But the contention here is that the
constellation involved in U.S. security space, both
government and commercial satellites, has
expanded to the point that it presents a dispersed
and difficult target for any would be attacker.
Weakening the relative strategic position of the
United States in space by attacks on satellites
would therefore require patterns of behavior over
3
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University Press, 1995).
4
For a discussion of the negative impact of ambiguity
on verification of arms control agreements, see
“Verification and Compliance,” in Albert Carnesale
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(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1987), Chapter 11,
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5
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protracted periods of time and directed at space. 6
Such patterns would create opportunities for
detection and make the larger effort visible.
Many claim that this process is currently
underway. Supposing this analysis is based on
fact, it underlines the conclusion that the problem
is not detection, but concerting action both
nationally and internationally to respond.
SPACE AS A DOMAIN FOR
VERIFICATION
From the point of view of verification, the
most obvious attribute of space is also the most
relevant: space is transparent.7 Moreover, space
is a medium and long-term environment where the
process of research, development, and deployment
is measured in decades. The provision that the
U.S. be aware of significant changes “in time to
respond” is therefore less stringent, especially
since the appropriate response may be in domains
other than space.
Technology has sometimes held out the hope (or
the threat) of making space less transparent as a
way of bestowing unilateral strategic advantage.
This would be the effect, for example, of “stealth”
technology in space. There are reports in open
sources of programs to create stealthy satellites, as
well as reports that such programs proved
technologically infeasible and have been
abandoned. Such technologies would obviously
pose challenges for verification; indeed, the
proliferation of stealth technology might well
hasten the trend toward congested and contested
space, with no obvious remedy. The unilateral
possession of stealth technology (or its equivalent)

6

As distinguished from denying space services to a
particular battlefield at a particular time, a capability
which military planners should assume potential
adversaries have or will soon have.
7
The contrast is with the terrestrial arms race, where
crucial behavior was often opaque. The United States
had no physical description of the Soviet SS-20
MRBM (which changed the strategic balance in
Europe) until it was deployed, and no imagines of it
until the INF treaty was signed. Chemical and
biological weapon production can, and has been,
successfully disguised. There is no direct analogue in
space.

by the United States could well provide military
advantage.
But history teaches that such a technological
edge—from tanks to ballistic missiles to nuclear
weapons to SLBMs to MIRV’s—is usually shortlived. The general proliferation of stealth
technology in orbit would make establishing a
stable environment much more difficult, if not
impossible, and would be very disadvantageous to
the United States as the predominate player. It
would, by definition, defeat efforts for constraints
on specific and observable behaviors and would
necessarily degrade situational awareness for all
actors.
There are also stealth implications in the recent
trend toward miniaturization of satellites. Small
satellites could in theory be used as co-orbiting
kinetic kill or close proximity explosive devices
(the euphemism is “non-cooperative rendezvous”)
and in this guise would be, in effect, intelligent
space mines. They might not be too small to see,
but conceivably too small to track and therefore to
counter. There is no restriction in international
law against orbiting a space mine in proximity to
military satellites. It has been technologically
feasible since the advent of maneuverable
satellites, but the option—though explored by the
Soviets in the 1970s—has not been pursued. 8
Making such devices small in size would, in
theory, also make them deployable in larger
numbers at lower cost. Still, a program
significant enough to meet our threshold of
verifiability “within reasonable limits” would
have to be extensive and involve launch,
command and control, and testing activities that
would potentially leave signatures observable in a
variety of domains, including the electromagnetic
spectrum. If very small satellites do represent a
potentially undetectable threat, they would fall
into the category of those things—like bans on
laboratory-based research and development—
which are neither observable nor verifiable and
therefore fall out of the realm of any regime of
reciprocal constraints. This is a judgment for
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others with better access to information about
actual programs.
A Short History of Verification and of Space
Arms Control
All treaties that contain binding
obligations are subject to verification, whether or
not the treaty language includes verification
provisions.9 The Limited Test Ban Treaty
(1963)—the first arms control agreement that
mentions space—contained no reference to
verification. Verification had been a central issue
in negotiations, but distrust between the two sides,
and the closed society that was the Soviet Union,
made cooperative measures impossible, and space
reconnaissance was still in its infancy.
The Soviets took the position that both sides
possessed adequate means to verify compliance
without intrusive measures like on-site inspection,
and that compliance would be compelled by the
pressure of international public opinion. President
Eisenhower responded that only the largest tests
could be detected with certainty and that an
effective test ban would therefore require
“inspection and control”—i.e., that adequate
verification would require a combination of
unilateral, cooperative, and multilateral measures,
including seismic monitoring stations and a
multilateral control commission empowered to
make on-site inspections on demand.
In the end, the scope of the treaty was limited to
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and under water—i.e., the scope of
constraint was reduced to what the parties were
confident each could verify unilaterally without
the more intrusive verification measures that more
extensive constraints would have required. In the
aftermath, each of the superpowers made
considerable effort to monitor compliance, and
each raised compliance issues with the other,
although there is no evidence that either side was
ever in violation. For our purposes, the LTBT
was both the first agreement constraining
activities in space, and the first Cold War example

9

By the same token, voluntary or declaratory measures
that are not specific and not binding cannot be verified
in the sense the term is used here.
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of the practice of limiting constraints to those that
could be verified unilaterally by the parties.10
That practice continued through the nuclear arms
negotiations of the following decades; viz., as
national technical means improved, counting rules
evolved from counting launchers to counting
warheads, the key being, as Hays comments,
“what could be seen.” An exception to this
pattern was the Biological Weapons Convention
(1972) which, like the LTBT, contained no
verification regime, but, unlike the LTBT,
constrained activities (the production of biological
weapons) that were inherently undetectable by
outside observers.
The BWC was the last agreement in the Cold War
era that did not include specific verification
measures. The trend beginning with bilateral
U.S./Soviet nuclear limitation agreements in the
1970’s was to incorporate verification measures of
increasing complexity and intrusiveness in treaty
language, including a variety of “cooperative
measures” by which the parties were obliged to
take steps to enhance the visibility of their
programs. Generally speaking, the extent and
intrusiveness of verification measures depended
on:
•

•

•

The “transparency” of the domain
involved, i.e., the inherent ease of
disguising or difficulty in observing noncomplaint behaviors;
The “criticality” of agreed constraints,
i.e., whether small changes in the existing
balance of forces might be difficult to
detect and have disproportionately serious
consequences;
The general state of relations or “trust
factor” between the parties, and therefore
the possibility of cooperative verification
measures to increase transparency.

Verification also became more prominent in the
negotiations of arms control as skepticism grew,
10

Clay Moltz argues that the LTBT, and the subsequent
agreement (General Assembly Resolution 1884) not to
deploy weapons of mass destruction in space were
“critical” to allowing the further development of space
for satellite reconnaissance and manned missions. See
Moltz, Politics of Space Security, p. 141.
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particularly in the U.S. Senate, about the
reliability of the Soviets as a partner, and the
benefit of arms control regimes in general. This
trend is well illustrated by the detailed on-site, ondemand inspection regime of the last of the Cold
War treaties, that dealing with chemical weapons,
but it had already been evident in the treaty
eliminating intermediate range nuclear forces in
Europe (INF).

The absence of verification provisions reflected
U.S. confidence that it possessed the independent
means to verify satisfactorily the constraints
contained in the Outer Space Treaty. The absence
of verification measures was also a function of
limited superpower interest in undertaking banned
activities and U.S. desire to minimize focus on its
NTM capabilities or expose them to international
scrutiny.

The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty contains only one
provision that might be said to have the purpose
of verification: a provision that all parties with
facilities on the moon allow reciprocal visits by
others with similar facilities (Article VII). The
background was fear of the strategic value of the
moon both as a base for nuclear attack and for the
surreptitious testing of nuclear weapons. Such
fears proved unfounded. Otherwise, the OST was
silent on the issue of verification, although it
contains several provisions that impose
constraints on freedom of action in space.

During ratification hearings for the OST in the
Senate, Administration witnesses argued that
although the U.S. national technical means (NTM)
could not verify the purpose or content of any
particular object in space, it could detect mass
deployments before they became “militarily
significant.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Wheeler also said the United States would prefer
using its own resources for verification rather than
relying on any international on-site inspection
regime, and Secretary of State Rusk claimed that
the United States was confident of its ability to
detect any deployment of nuclear or weapons of
mass destruction in space. 12

The most prominent example is the stationing of
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction in space, on the moon, or on other
celestial bodies (Article IV). But states parties are
also enjoined to carry on their activities “with due
regard to the corresponding interests of all other
States Parties to the Treaty” and to avoid “harmful
contamination” of the space environment (Article
IX), provisions that might be interpreted to apply
to debris-causing ASAT tests in space. The OST
also obligates parties to consult with others when
they have reason to believe their activities in
space will cause “harmful interference” with the
space operations of other parties (Article IX), a
provision that Hays interprets as forbidding
jamming, blinding, or otherwise disrupting space
activities without prior consultation.11

11

The range of possible activities requiring prior
consultation are described by Hays as, “should not jam,
blind, or otherwise disrupt unless required for selfdefense or during hostilities.” See Hays, United States
Military Space, p. 51. Hays also points out that the
International Telecommunications Convention
prohibits “jamming or disruption” except in selfdefense or war.

ASAT Negotiations
The Carter Administration undertook ASAT
limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union
beginning in 1978. Three sessions were held, but
the results were inconclusive. The United States
opened with a proposal for a complete prohibition
on anti-satellite weapons. The Soviets seemed to
have been without specific instructions but
generally opposed an outright ban. The Soviets
alleged that the Space Shuttle could be viewed as
a potential ASAT weapon. They also argued that
certain satellite operations by third parties could
threaten state sovereignty and anti-satellite
capability was a legitimate means of selfdefense; 13 the Soviets had begun to consider the
threat posed by Chinese space capability, against
which their ASAT program was also directed. 14
12

Hays, p. 70 describes the Administration arguments
on verification during the Senate debate on ratification
of the OST. General Wheeler elsewhere noted for the
record that the “Joint Chiefs of Staff remain concerned
about the assurance of verification capability with
regards to weapons in orbit,” quoted in Stares, p. 104.
13
Carnesale and Haass, pp.144-145.
14
Ibid.
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Verification was a subject of concern, but other
factors were more important, among them
asymmetry in capability. 15 By 1978, the Soviets
had an operational ASAT system, which they
refused to dismantle; the U.S. capability was in
development, but a conventional system had not
yet been tested or deployed. The Pentagon was
also concerned about the vulnerability of the U.S.
security space constellation, which at this point
was still relatively small. According to John
Wertheimer, OSD and JCS preferred to rely on
U.S. technological superiority rather than arms
control to address what they saw as a dangerous
ASAT imbalance. 16
In response to DoD concerns, President Carter
adopted a “two-track” policy, i.e., continuation of
ASAT development while negotiations on
banning ASAT continued. Like most “two-track”
approaches (the INF negotiations of the 1980’s
are another example) the tactic was intended as
much to assuage differences of opinion within the
Administration as to impress the Soviets with U.S.
resolve. Given fears about Soviet plans to deploy
systems in space to launch or facilitate attacks in
the atmosphere—particularly satellites to enable
targeting of carrier battle groups—there was also
reluctance to give up U.S. offensive ASAT
options.
In terms of our analysis, none of the variables
conducive to agreement on verification were
optimized. Rudimentary capability of space
situational awareness meant that space, though
inherently transparent, was not practically so.
Because the United States relied on a very small
number of military satellites, small changes in the
balance had potentially disproportionate
consequences. And trust between the parties was
very low.
Stares, who conducted a number of interviews
with U.S. negotiators, reported fundamental
disagreement between key players on the U.S.
15

Stares claims that DoD concerns focused not on
verification difficulties but on limitations to U.S.
freedom of action. See Paul B. Stares, Militarization of
Space (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 197.
16
Carnesale and Haass, p. 146-147.
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side. The State Department and Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency pressed for
comprehensive ASAT restrictions; DoD coalesced
around a non-use/non-interference ban. The
Soviets were unwilling to discuss a non-use ban
extending beyond the two superpowers; the U.S.
wanted to extend coverage to its allies. This
mutual recalcitrance and the failure of the U.S. to
agree on a unified position (rather than concerns
about verifiability) were the chief impediments to
agreement. With the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the climate for arms control
deteriorated, and after adjournment the ASAT
talks were never resumed. 17
In the intervening thirty years, some of the
projected threats to, and military uses of, satellites
have proved illusory. 18 Weapon platforms in
space continue to have proponents, but
vulnerability issues have not been resolved, and
feasibility has not been proven. Predictions that
armadas of orbiting ASAT vehicles were
inevitable if negotiations failed proved unfounded.
Formal arms control limitations aimed at space
were replaced by tacit agreement between the
superpowers. Of this tacit approach it might be
said that the two sides decided independently that
an arms race in an offense-dominant environment
like space would be technologically challenging,
ultimately futile, and meanwhile would divert
vital resources in large amounts from more
immediate security needs. Research continued;
testing and deployment did not.

17

This account is taken from Stares who also claims
that a draft non-use agreement was prepared, seemed to
represent “common ground” but was not concluded.
Regarding the two-track strategy, he comments: “But
like all bargaining chip arguments, the two-track policy
could be maintained so long as the question of what the
US wanted to prohibit, or put differently, what it was
willing to forego, did not need to be addressed. Once
negotiations with the Soviets began in earnest, the
basic incompatibility of goals within the administration
made conflict inevitable.” See Stares, p. 200.
18
A High Frontier civilian panel noted “strong
indications” in the early 1980’s that the Soviet Union
was going to deploy “power directed energy weapons”
in space and thereby “alter the balance of world power”
(RAND, p. 14).
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Categories of Arms Control and Normative
Restrictions

Because the general nature of threats to
satellites has been well understood for decades,
the categories of possible arms control and
limitation agreements is also well known. These
include limitations on orbiting in proximity to
certain satellites (so-called “keep out zones”), 19
operations in transfer orbits or other critical
regions of space, the testing or deployment of
dedicated ASAT weapons (whether in space or
within the atmosphere) or of other systems such as
BMD “in ASAT mode,” and on electro-magnetic
or other interference with satellites. The last of
these is arguably already prohibited by the OST
and the International Telecommunication
Convention. 20
The verification requirements of various regimes
would differ in intrusiveness depending on the
inherent visibility of prohibited actions;
verification of bans on some categories of
weapons, viz., ground-based laser generators,
might require on-site inspections. Other
constraints—for example, bans on kinetic ASAT
testing—could be verified with less intrusive
measures. 21 Activities grouped under the general
heading of research and development are
inherently ambiguous and therefore probably
outside any regime of mutual constraint.
19

Keep out zones might be challenged as violations of
the OST prohibition on claims of sovereignty in space
(Article 11)
20
There is an obvious overlap in capability between air
defense, ballistic missile defense, and anti-satellite
weapons. The distinction comes not so much in the
capability as in the testing of such weapons and is
based on the assumption that no country will rely on a
system which has not been tested in its intended role.
The use of this approach as a means of distinguishing
SAM and ABM interceptors during ABM negotiations
is discussed in Johnson, pp. 184-185.
21
It has been argued that a viable kinetic kill ASAT
capability could be tested via near encounters without
impact and the resultant, and highly visible, debris
field. This argues for equipping satellites with sensors
to detect activity within the neighborhood of their
obits. Deploying a system to threaten a significant
portion of U.S. satellites with this sort of single
encounter, hit-to-kill capability would be an extensive
and time-consuming effort.

Probably for this reason, no ban on research and
development has been proposed by any
responsible player.
A prohibition on stationing of weapons of any
nature in orbit or on celestial bodies (although not
of potential ASAT devices on the surface) is the
central feature of the Chinese/Russian “Draft
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of
Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT).
The sixth article of that draft treaty does not so
much deal with as dismiss the question of
verification, putting it off to “possible future
protocols.”
Verification and the Current Regulatory
Regimes in Space
Characterizing space as the “last frontier”
may blind us to the fact that it is already, at least
in theory, a highly regulated environment.22
Requirements for and constraints on behavior in
space are subject to a variety of administrative
requirements, U.N. resolutions, and treaty law,
including, most prominently, the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967. The OST grew out of a UN
“Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space” (1962) and had the effect, as
described by William Durch, of “(transforming) a
nonbinding, international consensus on the
political/military conduct of space into legal
obligations.” 23 But the Treaty was perhaps less
foundational than often described, in part because
it placed specific constraints on activities (such as
the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit or on
celestial bodies, or creation of military
installations on the moon) that the only two

22

A full description of the regulatory regime in space
can be found in Kasku-Jackson and Waldrop, Chapter
4 of Space and Defense Policy (op cit).
23
Durch, William J. National Interests and the
Military Use of Space (Ballinger Publishing, 1984), p.
176. Hays and others argue that the OST provided
reassurance to U.S. policy makers that space would not
be an arena of strategic completion, and sent the
message that the U.S. itself did not see space has
having ‘a great deal of military utility’ (see Hays, p.
71).
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significant space powers had already decided not
to pursue.

of action in space more than they value
constraining the freedom of action of others.

Even in areas of Treaty-imposed constraint that
remained pertinent, particularly the prohibitions
against “interfering with other states’ spacerelated activities” and “damaging the space
environment,” the OST had less than decisive
impact—not because of an inability to verify but
an unwillingness to enforce. This unwillingness
apparently stemmed from concern about
disclosing sources and methods, and a reluctance
to contribute to the establishment of norms that
might limit freedom of action.

Another agreement from the Cold War era not to
interfere with “national technical means of
verification” (NTM), on the other hand, had
considerable—though generally
unacknowledged—effect on ordering the space
environment. Non-interference with NTM was a
key element in the verification regimes of nuclear
arms control. It appeared in successive strategic
arms limitation and reduction agreements and in
the INF agreement of 1987. 26 Because neither of
the two Cold War superpowers wished to specify
which of its satellites were engaged in verifying
compliance, both extended the general ban on
non-interference to the entire national security
space constellation of the other.

For example, although there have been numerous
cases in the last forty years of heedless creation of
debris and crowding of spectra, none of the major
space actors has ever accused another of violating
the Treaty. Even in the case of the most flagrant
recent example of “damage” to the space
environment—the debris created by the 2007
Chinese ASAT test—only the Japanese protested
on the basis of the Outer Space Treaty. While the
OST can reasonably be read as prohibiting
“jamming, blinding or otherwise disrupting unless
required for self-defense or during hostilities,” 24 it
has not been interpreted by any major party to
prohibit the sorts of activities that have led
officials to describe space as increasingly
“contested.” Indeed, far from strengthening
verifiable norms of behavior in space, lack of
enforcement of the OST has arguably weakened
them—to the point the authors of the European
Code of Conduct thought it appropriate to include
a highly qualified and voluntary pledge to refrain
from intentional interference, even though most
nations are already bound to such a provision in
the OST as a matter of treaty law.
Why is this? Moltz comments on the modus
operandi that arose between the Soviet Union and
the United States during the Cold War that each
side appeared to value its own assets more than it
valued the ability to destroy the assets of its
adversaries. 25 So it might be said of the parties to
the OST that all seem to value their own freedom

It can be argued that restrictions on interference
with NTM reflected rather than caused the modus
operandi in space between the United States and
Soviet Union that began in the 1970s and
continues to our day. What is clear is that such a
modus operandi did emerge. Despite a period of
extended development and testing in the 1970s
and early 1980s, both sides eventually abandoned
kinetic ASAT programs. Some ASAT weapons
imagined in the 1960s like rail guns and directedenergy weapons were not pursued. There was no
offensive arms race in space, and neither side
made space a primary focus of either offensive or
defensive action in the case of hostilities. There
were also technical, political, and budgetary
reasons for this of course. But, as Moltz argues,
both sides saw the benefits in mutual restraint, and
constantly improving NTM technology meant
increasing confidence that restraint was
reciprocated and not a source of strategic
disadvantage. The nuclear sanctuary in space
fostered by the LTBT provided further assurance
of stability, and therefore encouragement to
exploit the domain for both military and civil
purposes.

26

24
25

Hays, p. 51.
Moltz, p. 50.

A discussion of arms control treaties and their
relationship to NTM is found in Jonty Kasku-Jackson
and Elizabeth Waldrop, “Understanding Space Law,”
Space and Defense Policy, p. 73 as well as Pete Hays,
“Space and the Military,” ibid, pp. 56-59.
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through on-site inspection by groups of
international observers. The principal
example is the nuclear non-proliferation
regime incorporated in the NonProliferation Treaty and overseen by the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Multilateral verification has the advantage
of allowing concerted international action
for enforcement of violations. It can also
create new norms or strengthen existing
ones. It has the disadvantage of requiring
agreement between multiple international
actors who may have differing interests or
interpretations of events.

A Typology of Verification Regimes
This brief history leads to the conclusion
that verification and enforcement are inextricably
linked. It is not enough to detect noncompliance; it must also have negative
consequences for the perpetrator. That requires
both publicizing violation and concerting
international efforts to respond. Some verification
regimes are more likely to be effective in this
regard than others, and combinations of several
types might solve what emerge from our analysis
as the twin problems of detection, on the one hand,
and deterrence on the other.
•

We have identified four categories of verification
regimes, three of which have been well studied in
the past, and one of which (at least in its emerging
form) is new. These are:
•

Unilateral Verification: This includes
National Technical Means (NTM)
discussed above, but can also include
other forms of reconnaissance,
intelligence, and surveillance carried out
by assets under U.S. control or that of
trusted partners.

•

Cooperative Verification: Cooperative
verification requires that participants
agree to forego certain measures to
disguise behavior, and/or take other steps
to enhance transparency. Verification
“regimes” in arms control agreements are
usually composed of such cooperative
measures. For example, the INF Treaty
required the parties to allow on-site
observation of destruction of the systems
by means specified in the treaty. Noninterference with means of verification is
an essential element in any cooperative
regime. Cooperative measures are also
useful as early indicators that one or more
parties may have decided that an agreed
regime is no longer in its interest, i.e., that
the equilibrium sought in the agreement is
no longer applicable. In that case, friction
may arise in the system as cooperative
measures become less cooperative.

•

Multilateral Verification. Multilateral
verification is usually accomplished

27

“Open” Verification: With regard to
space, open verification is a new concept,
leveraging the increasing transparency of
space to private observers. A precedent
was established in the 1970s by the
spontaneous organization of “Helsinki
Watch Groups” to monitor Soviet
compliance with the human rights
provisions of the Helsinki Agreement on
European Cooperation and Security
(CSCE). The reports of these groups
were both more detailed and more
credible than information other CSCE
member nations had been able or willing
to provide. The groups were enabled by
the mandatory publication in all CSCE
member states of the provisions of the
CSCE agreement, and by the existence of
new (albeit still rudimentary) channels for
communicating their findings to the West.
The potential of “open” verification
increases enormously because of instant
and worldwide cyber connectivity, as was
graphically demonstrated in the recent
past by DARPA and its Network
Challenge experiment.27 It also increases

In brief, DARPA tethered ten, eight-foot diameter,
red balloons at random spots on public land throughout
the contiguous 48 states and issued an open challenge
to find them, offering a $20,000 prize. The winning
team from MIT offered $1,000 to anyone who could
refer them to someone with information about the
balloons, and $1000 to the person with that
information. The challenge quickly went viral on the
web, and all ten balloons were found in under nine
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with the volume and accuracy of orbital
information made available by
governments. With regard to space, an
“open” verification regime would be
based on the worldwide private space
observer community. This community
already collects volumes of information
about the behavior of objects in space and
discusses it over the web, noting
anomalies to include spotting satellites
not registered as required by international
agreement, the United Nations’
Registration Convention. If international
“norms” for behavior in space, such as
those suggested by private groups and the
European Union, are to be adopted, open
verification is the obvious, and perhaps
the only, verification method that would
be applicable. It might provide a vehicle
for calling attention to aberrant behavior
in space without compromising sources
and methods. But open verification lacks
any enforcement component except for
“public pressure,” and might therefore
create more obstacles for open,
democratic societies where public
pressure can be brought to bear than in
closed societies where it has little
relevance.
These categories of verification are obviously not
mutually exclusive. Generally speaking, all
treaties or agreements of any kind that require
nations to engage in or forego specified activities
are subject to verification by unilateral means.
The fact that SALT and other nuclear arms
treaties specified that verification was to be by
“national technical means of verification” did not
create a new right for countries to verify in that
way; the innovation was in mutual recognition
that the ability to verify was in the strategic
interest of both parties. In effect, the parties
agreed that strategic stability required not only
self-restraint but transparency. This would not
have been possible without a minimal level of
trust. But as President Reagan often emphasized,
the requirement was to “trust but verify,”

hours. Details can be found at
https://networkchallenge.darpa.mil/ProjectReport.pdf.
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reflecting the melding of cooperation with the
independent ability to confirm compliance.28
Implications for Policy Makers
This foregoing analysis points to the
central (and familiar) dilemma for U.S. policy.
Any measure that affects U.S. freedom of action
in space imposes a cost. This includes not just
measures to restrict certain behaviors, but
verification measures that make U.S. space
operations more visible to potentially unfriendly
or disruptive observers. The question is whether
this short-term cost is offset by longer-term
benefits to the United States of a more stable and
predictable space environment.
There has always been a contradiction between
the desire of the United States (and other major
actors) for freedom of action in space, and a
common interest in a well-regulated domain. This
contradiction is not limited to space policy. 29
Until recently, that contradiction was overcome—
for many U.S. theorists—by the prospect of space
control, i.e., the notion that the United States
would use its dominant position to impose order
on the cosmos by enlisting willing collaborators
on the one hand, and using superior force against

28

Similarly, an element of cooperative verification
intruded into what was supposed to be a regime of
multilateral verification by force majeure, i.e., the postdefeat inspection of Iraq for weapons of mass
destruction. What was supposed to be a regime of
anywhere-anytime surprise inspection became instead a
process of negotiated access because the defeated party
continued to control the facilities to be inspected.
29
The Chief negotiator of the INF agreement with the
Soviets commented with regard to the debate over INF
limitations: “It was, and remains, difficult to find
common ground between those who believe that, in
general, the national security of the United States
would be strengthened if no limits were placed on the
weapons it could have, even if that would mean there
would be no limits on the same type of Soviet (or some
other adversaries) weapons, and those who believe the
national security of the United States would be
strengthened if limits were placed on the Soviet (or
some other adversaries) weapon systems, even if it
would mean limits on the same type of U.S. system.”
Maynard Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War,
(New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2006), p. 229.
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outliers on the other.30 The model often cited is
Mahan and the control of sea lines of
communication; the underlying assumption is that
space, as all other domains of human competition,
will inevitably be a theater of conflict. 31 Space
control remains an article of faith for many, but it
has become a residual element in the Obama
space policy. The dominant theme for the new
Administration is the necessity of cooperation. In
a congested and contested environment, a
cooperative approach assumes a measure of trust.
But as President Reagan pointed out in another
context, trust is not sufficient in itself. There is a
vital role as well for verification, i.e., our ability
to assure that U.S. impulses to collaborative
efforts in space, especially those involving U.S.
self-restraint, will not be exploited by others to
gain strategic advantage.
Improvements in U.S. space situational awareness
will enhance the timeliness and certainty of
verification. But these improvements are less
likely to come in future from unilateral U.S.
sources, if only because of constraints on
spending. This is what some have identified as
the “SSA challenge.” In a world of limited
resources, the emphasis will have to be on
improvements in SSA by other means, and in
particular by exploiting the possibilities of the
other three forms of verification, i.e., multilateral,
cooperative, and ‘open’ verification. There is
some reason to think that U.S. military services
recognize this reality, and also the associated
dilemma: taking full advantage of information
exchanges, reciprocal measures to increase
transparency (cooperative verification), and the
potential of the internet-empowered observer
30

See, for example, Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik:
Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, and Steven
Lambakis, On the Edge of the Earth: The Future of
American Space Power, (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2001).
31
No one thinks conflict in space is inevitable this
week or even this year. In that sort of timeframe, all
would agree that conflict or its absence depends on
decisions of policy makers. Inevitable conflict always
takes place in what might be called “ideological time,”
i.e. a time remote enough in the future that particular
circumstances are necessarily unknown to us, and
ideological preconceptions can therefore be liberated
from the sobering influence of facts.

community means becoming ourselves more
transparent. Where to draw the line?
To a degree, reality may make the choice for us.
Some measures, particularly expanded exchanges
of information, are already taking hold among
commercial operators. There is pressure from the
commercial community for expanded information
exchanges with governments, combined with a
willingness to facilitate improvements in SSA by
hosting (albeit not funding) SSA payloads. As
well, there are autonomous developments—
facilitated by greater U.S. openness—which have
potential both to aid detection of non-compliance
and make such acts politically more consequential.
These include what we identify as “open”
verification, i.e., harnessing the power of the
private observer community and the connectivity
of the internet to monitor activities in space.
Internet communities are good at finding things
and identifying anomalies; they may also be
credible in a way that national actors are not. The
effectiveness of such programs depends on: 1) the
existence of agreed, specific, and observable
norms of behavior, and 2) the amount and nature
of information governments are willing to make
available.
Increasing the openness of space operations and
the availability of SSA information inevitably
involves inequity for the United States. Because
we can see more and see further, others stand to
gain more in the short run than we do. A political
judgment will be needed as to whether the long
term gain in stability and predictability outweighs
this short term, relative disadvantage. One thing
is certain; some operations will always be kept
from public view, not just by the United States but
by all major space-faring nations.
On the other hand, this aspect of the emerging
situation—the trend, both intentional and
autonomous—toward greater transparency also
plays to U.S. strengths. What we call “open”
verification is a new category, enabled by the
greater availability of information on the one hand
and internet connectivity on the other. In this
“emerging networked world,” as Anne-Marie
Slaughter has argued, “. . . the state with the most
connections will be the central player, able to set
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the global agenda.”32 This raises the possibility of
a system of public-private verification, drawing
on public and government resources, which has
both potentially positive and negative aspects, but
may be—in our interconnected world—an
inevitable next step. The advantage the United
States has in connectivity, transparency, trust, and
situational awareness makes it the nation best
positioned to be the central player in space. It
also makes possible extra-national capabilities for
space awareness and verification that could not
have been imagined in the Cold War.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The central conclusion of this analysis is
that verification is not an obstacle to arms control
or other agreements that include reciprocal
restrictions on the freedom of action in space of
the United States and other major players. This is
not to say that all potentially disruptive activities
in space are verifiable or proper subjects for arms
control agreements; but means are available to
increase predictability and stability in space by
reciprocal constraints on disruptive actions,
including certain maneuvers, operations in certain
orbits and/or the testing of dedicated or other
ASAT systems whether space based or surface
based, that are observable and in regard to which
compliance can be verified. A well-constructed
verification regime will incorporate a necessary
element of unilateral capability along with
measures to make verification more certain and
politically effective by making use of the inherent
strengths (and limiting the potential costs) of
international consensus, multilateral inspection
regimes, and the credibility of public oversight of
potentially non-compliant activity.
For those variables we have identified as affecting
the scope and intrusiveness of verification
measures, the transparency of the domain is much
32

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2009. Although she doesn’t
deal specifically with space, Slaughter argues that
“connectivity is power” in all realms of human
endeavor. Slaughter manages to synthesize the sort of
national dominance exemplified in space by the “space
control” model, with the cooperative paradigm inherent
in a world of connectivity. All will be connected; but
the United States will be more connected than others.
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greater than it was even five years ago, the
criticality of small changes has diminished (as the
number of satellites engaged in national security
activities has multiplied many fold) and the trust
between actors—though far from perfect—is
nonetheless greater than it was in the Cold War.
Verification does not ensure against cheating, and
neither norms nor treaties may apply in a wartime
environment. But a well-constructed verification
regime can make evidence of violation timely and
less ambiguous, providing a stronger case for
collective efforts to respond before a crisis
becomes a conflict. An adversary seeking to
exploit mutual constraint to gain unilateral
advantage would have to mount a significant
program over a protracted period of time that
would leave signatures in a variety of domains.
A broad spectrum of verification methods, from
independent national capabilities, to multilateral
or cooperative regimes, and even open approaches
using private observers, will increase the
probability of detection and give greater
credibility and legitimacy to the analysis of
disputed activity.
We conclude that the ability of the least
competent major actor to verify compliance will
define the outer boundaries of what is possible in
arms control. 33 Our conclusion is based on the
assessment that if meaningful strategic
consequences are possible as the result of noncompliance, no strategic actor will rely for
information from any source it does not control.
For that reason, the most competent player is
unlikely to be faced with international consensus
for constraints that exceed its verification
capabilities. The requirement independently to
verify is less true of second tier space powers,
who have limited independent space surveillance
capability.
We predict the emergence of “trust groups”
clustered around major countries that do have
such capability. It follows that a possible locus
for competition in space (which may already be
taking place) is the competition among major
actors to expand their trust groups, and therefore
33

By “least competent major actor” we mean the state
with the most limited capability that is nevertheless
critical to enforcement or implementation.
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build international support for the interpretation of
events in space that reflects and serves their
individual interests.
In this competition, the nation with the most
comprehensive, credible and available
information—and the greatest willingness to share
it—will have a decisive advantage. At the
moment, and for the foreseeable future, that
country is the United States. The United States,
as the predominant player, also has the most at
stake in regimes that limit freedom of action, and
therefore the greatest interest in ensuring that, if
such restrictions are put in play, they can be
adequately verified, incorporated in binding
agreements rather than amorphous systems of
‘norms’, and that non-compliance will be visible
to a wide international community. Sharing
information and opening space to greater public
scrutiny is relevant to enforcement of restrictions
on activities in space, since these may well be
invisible to many international actors whose
cooperation is necessary to make sanctions or
other collective actions to punish non-compliance
more effective. On the other hand, if public
transparency does have such an inhibiting impact,
that effect is likely to be greater in open societies
than in those where both information and public
opinion are tightly controlled.
Fortunately, the emphasis on verification plays to
U.S. strengths. 34 The Chinese/Russian draft treaty
prohibiting the stationing of weapons in space
(PPWT) is precise on what should be limited but
vague on verification. The Chinese in particular
have presented this as a concession to U.S.
sensitivities about its activities in space; but it
may also reflect a relative weakness of capability
and reluctance by the authors of the PPWT to
make their own space programs more transparent.
The United States is in a far different position
regarding both openness and capability. It can
therefore ensure its interests and capitalize on its
strengths by taking precisely the opposite tack, i.e.,
by making verification the first rather than the last
34

This is, in essence, an extension to space of
Slaughter’s argument that “In the twenty-first century,
the United States’ exceptional capacity for connection,
rather than splendid isolation or hegemonic
domination, will renew its power and restore its global
purpose.” (Slaughter, ibid.)

focus of international discussions on binding
constraints in space. Since satellites themselves
will play an increasing role in space situational
awareness, non-interference with satellites will be
both the objective for any new agreement as well
as the standard by which compliance is measured.
Verification is not synonymous with enforcement.
Indeed, verification without enforcement—as has
been the case with the Outer Space Treaty—
arguably weakens rather than strengthens the
incentive for restraint. There is a tendency in any
negotiation to use vague or ambiguous language
to achieve consensus. Ambiguous norms provide
the appearance of regulation without imposing
specific constraints, and thereby may satisfy both
those who favor greater structure in space and
those who insist on freedom of action. But that
ambiguity will be multiplied several times in the
resulting verification regime, increasing
uncertainty, suspicion, disagreement, and
generally conducing to disorder rather than order.
Precision should therefore not be sacrificed to
consensus in either the terms of agreements or the
description of how compliance will be verified.
Indeed, precision of language may be more
important for establishing verifiable constraints on
activities in space than the form such agreements
take, i.e., whether voluntary norms or treaty
language. Unfortunately, the trend seems to be
precisely in the opposite direction, i.e., to
transform the relatively precise obligations of the
Outer Space Treaty into vaguely worded, highly
qualified, and voluntary undertakings. This is true
of the various schemes of “norms” for behavior in
space. In short, verification is only potentially
stabilizing if it establishes compliance with
specific and observable rules (whether established
by “hard” or “soft” law), and parties are willing to
call others to account. Otherwise, such schemes
may serve only to verify that no real agreed order
exists.
We conclude that verification is a natural area for
U.S. leadership and presents an opportunity to
achieve objectives formerly couched in terms of
being able physically to dominate space. The
United States does have—and will likely
maintain—information dominance. This presents
policymakers with two options for continued
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protection of U.S. space assets. The first is to
maintain a “closed system,” keeping national
security systems out of public catalogs and relying
on its own capabilities to verify the activities of
states that do the same. The disadvantages with
this approach are twofold. It fosters suspicion
about U.S. actions and intentions that cannot be
publicly dispelled and hampers its ability to hold
others accountable for disruptive activity since to
do so would reveal the extent or limits of U.S.
surveillance capability. A clever and dedicated
adversary will be apt to push the limits of
tolerance for disruptive actions, confident that
leaders in Washington will choose to remain silent.
The alternative course of action would be to
capitalize on the principle of non-interference
with systems involved in verifying compliance
with any agreement. This includes placement of

sensors on a variety of space platforms,
whether hosted on commercial systems or
integrated into government vehicles (civil and
military alike). It applies as well to those
observation and analysis systems based on the
ground involved in such work. There are two
potential advantages: first, detection
capabilities are improved through means that
can be used publicly to hold disruptive actors
accountable to international scrutiny while
protecting sources or methods. A
proliferation of government, commercial,
multilateral and public observation
mechanisms makes it more difficult for a
disruptive actor to escape public exposure. 35
Second, by entangling an ever-increasing
number of satellites in the verification regime
the principle of non-interference is broadened
to include a greater number of satellites.
Non-interference is, in the end, a primary goal
of any peacetime protection efforts and may
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be achieved without formal negotiation of any
new agreements or arms control, building on
existing traditions as discussed above.
Entanglement of government and commercial
systems, both domestic and foreign, can also
contribute to deterrence by complicating an
adversary’s decision-making calculus. 36
Shifting the focus to verification will help
define the range of constraint and/or arms
control measures that follow and will provide
a basis for hope of their achieving broad
international consensus and impact. More
importantly, it will allow the United States to
reassert leadership in an area of its relative
strength, help fend off proposals by others
designed solely for tactical diplomatic
advantage, and set a practical agenda likely to
have broad international appeal. This would
be an appropriate initiative to take up in the
Committee on Disarmament or any other
international venue where the security and
sustainability of the space domain is an issue.

35

Public scrutiny of space activities has increased
significantly in its specificity in recent years, as
exemplified by analysis of Chinese orbital rendezvous
maneuvers concerning the Shi Jian 12 and Shi Jian
06F satellites. See Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the
Dark: The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F,”
The Space Review, 30 August 2010, found at
www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1.
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For a discussion of entanglement as a component of
deterrence see the Eisenhower Center’s Space
Deterrence Study, p. 20, found at
web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Spac
e_and_Defense_Studies/
Space_Deterrence.html.

Essay

Publisher’s Corner: Don’t Call It Cyberspace
Roger G. Harrison

It is said of human beings that we are a
pattern discerning species. We tend to search for
or invent patterns even where none exist—hence
the popularity of power point. 1 When we deal
with something truly unprecedented, our tendency
is nonetheless to find some precedent for it, or,
failing that, to fall back on analogy, metaphor or
simile, all tools the mind uses to confront the
unknown future with the familiar—which is one
reason that large organizations faced with unique
challenges almost invariably get it wrong.
We are in danger of doing that again as we
organize to deal with challenges to national
security presented by the unique phenomenon of
cyber, and do so based on comparisons between
cyber and space—or, more radically, on the
notion that these are, for practical purposes,
aspects of the same thing. This is the synergy
thesis, on the basis of which Air Force Space
Command is now charged with the responsibility
for cyber as well. Former Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force Jeffrey Harris told a recent
symposium at CSIS that in his view space and
cyber were ‘merging and aligning.’
It isn’t immediately clear what any of this means.
How do you ‘merge’ a tangible, physical
1

It is a mark of the essential difference between cyber
and space that the latter can be represented adequately
on a power point slide (or more commonly a very large
number of them) whereas the former cannot be. Power
point is good at describing structure but very bad
dealing with abstraction, and cyber is an abstraction,
representing our efforts to imagine a universe
compounded of billions of independent transactions
from millions of sources, some known, some unknown,
and some potentially generated by the environment
itself. Such a phenomenon cannot be represented
visually, which saves it (or should) from power point’s
intellectual death grip. Note that the cyber ‘cloud’
(itself a metaphor) is most often represented in power
point presentations not by lengthy explanation, or by
bulleted talking points, but by a drawing of a cartoon
cloud.

environment like space, with an intangible, virtual
environment like cyber? In what way do they
align? How do we capitalize on the mutually
reinforcing (synergistic?) characteristics of a
domain like space where doctrine changes at the
speed of bureaucracy, and a domain like cyber
which is so much in flux that even the concept of
doctrine doesn’t seem to apply?
The thesis here is precisely the opposite, i.e., that
cyber is something truly new and unique in human
experience. Nothing like it has existed before. So
we will have to do the tedious work of conceiving,
ab initio, an entirely new approach to
management, collaboration, procurement,
organization, and strategy. And we will have to
cultivate a new kind of strategic mind that can
lead in this unique environment.
Defenders of the synergy thesis will point out in
rebuttal the similarities between cyber and space.
For example, attribution of attack is a problem for
both space and cyber warriors; deterrence
therefore presents some of the same problems in
the two domains. 2 Satellites are one conduit
(although only one) for cyber communication, and
cyber is one possible vector for interfering with or
disabling satellites. Both space and cyber depend
on electromagnetic spectrum, and this dependence
makes both vulnerable to attack from a variety of
national and non-national actors with relatively
limited resources. 3 Both are arguably offense2

The problems are much more difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to resolve in cyber, another mark of
essential difference between cyber and space. Both the
Eisenhower Center and Rand Corporation published
studies of how deterrence might apply in space, given
the right combination of hardware and policies. The
most prominent study of cyber deterrence concludes,
on the contrary, that it is simply not possible.
3
This mutual vulnerability is not symmetrical. An
interruption of that portion of cyber communication
carried by satellites would be a serious inconvenience;
a compromised cyber network could render the
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dominant environments, i.e., environments in
which technology favors the attacker—
particularly preemptive attack—over defense.
And mission assurance in both domains is critical
to national security.
Still, these “points of contact” are to some degree
incidental 4 and in any case pale before the
differences between the two domains. Indeed,
space and cyber are not just different but
essentially antithetical, and the real question is not
how we combine their strengths (although we
should when we can) but how we keep them
safely distinct and prevent the culture of space—
with its endless procurement cycles, hierarchical
management structures, overlapping and mutually
hostile bureaucracies, glacial response times,
derivative strategic concepts, and aging,
entrenched work force—from seeping over into
the cyber environment.
Is antithetical too strong a word? It might be
argued that some differences between the two
domains are simply matters of degree. The most
obvious example is the need in cyber for much
greater speed in research, planning, procurement,
and training. The problem—a problem inherent in
the nature of the environment—is that the
traditional bureaucratic space management
structures are incapable of that kind of speed.5
Because operating in space is so expensive, their
emphasis is (properly) on redundancy and
robustness of systems, adherence to proven
protocols, and, above all, avoidance of mistakes.
Cyber, on the other hand, changes so rapidly that
yesterday’s protocols may be obsolete today and
self-defeating tomorrow. Because the cost of
entry in cyber is low, the opportunity and reward
for experimentation and innovation are
correspondingly high. Space may be ‘contested,’
information provided by satellites useless—or, at
worst, malicious.
4
Lists like this do not imply any existential connection
between cyber and space. Similar lists could be
constructed in relation to any two strategic domains,
for example space and air, or space and undersea.
5
The business plan of “new space” companies like
SpaceX is based on bringing cyber management
practices to traditional space operations, especially
launch. Whether it will work or not is open to
question.
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but in relation to cyber it is truly a peaceable
kingdom where the incidents of intentional
interference are rare. Our cyber networks, by
contrast, are attacked thousands of times every
day. We may be surprised in space as potential
adversaries attain capabilities more quickly than
we had anticipated, but that evolution will likely
measure in years and even decades. We can only
vaguely discern the challenges that will face us in
cyber a year from now; indeed, we are uncertain
of our grasp on those we confront at present. 6
These are not just differences in degree; they are
differences in kind and will require different kinds
of management structures, a different lexicon of
terms, and a new sort of strategic mind. Applying
the slow but certain model to cyber (treating it as
we treat space) is not just inappropriate but
potentially disastrous.
The commercial world provides a model of the
sort of management structures that work.
Companies that succeed in the cyber world tend—
at least initially—to be small and entrepreneurial.
Management structures are flat; talent is rewarded
regardless of rank (and rank in the traditional
sense is rare); innovation is favored; received
wisdom is treated with skepticism; power is
dispersed; doctrine is suspect; dogma is rejected.
The atmosphere reminds many in the older
generation of that which existed in the space
community forty years ago. The problem for
cyber companies is how to maintain those
characteristics as they succeed, and therefore
become larger and more bureaucratized, that is,
more like government. This raises the question of
whether government—and in particular the
military—can run a successful cyber operation.
How can it become more like these
entrepreneurial companies? More of that below.
6

The Obama Administration Space policy refers to the
possibilities of international agreements, including
arms control, for space. Historically, arms control
agreements only become possible when contending
sides believe that they understand the terrain
sufficiently to conclude that neither they nor their
adversaries can achieve unilateral advantage at
acceptable cost. This is, arguably, true of space, but
not of cyber, where the terrain is so uncertain that even
the parameters of theoretically stabilizing international
agreements are far from clear.

71

Space & Defense

In the meantime, it is likely that success in
national security cyber will require an
unprecedented level of cooperation with
commercial operators, whose experience is vital
and whose interests in cyber are essentially the
same as those of government. The old divisions
between government and industry, the public
sector and the private, will have to be (and are
being) re-drawn. 7
The sort of new lexicon we will need is more
difficult to describe. Perhaps the key here is to
understand the state of mind we need rather than
the concepts themselves, which are beyond the
scope of this brief paper. This state of mind might
be described as radical skepticism when it comes
to the application to cyber of any concept
(metaphor, analogy, or simile) developed in other
domains for other purposes.
To resort to these will be the inevitable tendency,
not because the concepts are applicable but
because we are comfortable with them and
because adopting them requires no new and
painful bureaucratic consensus building. What
constitutes offense and defense in cyber? What is
meant—or can anything be meant—by deterrence,
by escalation, by security and preemption in the
cyber domain? It may be that some or all of these
terms are useful, just as the concept of merging
domains may be useful, but only if we can
describe (and then agree on) what they mean in
this unique new world, and only if cyber stabilizes
sufficiently to ensure that they mean the same
thing from one planning cycle to the next.
Finally, we will need a different kind of strategic
mind, accustomed to irregularity, ready to make
mistakes, free of doctrine, hostile to dogma, and
alert to the principal thing (among many) that
makes cyber as a strategic environment something
new—that it is, in every sense, a product of our
imagination. When we enter space we encounter
what amounts to a toxic sea that erodes our bodies

and our machines; but space is indifferent to our
presence and imposes the same limitations on all
who operate there. When we enter cyber, we
encounter ourselves—the human psyche
electronically enhanced. Cyber exhibits all the
virtues and vices of our species: it is creative,
dynamic, perverse, innovative, evolutionary,
elusive, and constantly evolving. We can (at least
in theory) develop a doctrine for space and be
reasonably certain that it will still be applicable a
decade from now. Opponents can counter
strategize, but they labor under the same physical
limitations we do. In a sense, every punch will be
telegraphed; whether we are agile enough to react,
of course, is another issue.
There is no such assurance in cyber, where threats
come from everywhere, opponents appear and
disappear, motives other than greed can be
obscure, and doctrine (if we have any) will have
to be ad hoc, developed on the fly and discarded
just as quickly. We are not on a level playing
field in cyber; we are limited by law, others—
freelance individuals or non-state networks—are
not.
Which begs the previous question: where, aside
from the commercial sector, will we find
examples of how this threat can be countered, and
the leaders to do it?
The answer, paradoxically enough, is: the
military, or more specifically the Army and the
Marine Corps under pressure of combat. The
habits of mind that cyber requires are being
developed at the moment in the conflict with
insurgencies, particularly in Afghanistan. Brian
O’Keefe described the phenomenon in a recent
issue of “Fortune” magazine (March 22, 2010).
Industry was, O’Keefe wrote, “skeptical of
structure” and therefore looking to the military
veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for
the kind of young leaders who are “comfortable
with complexity,” and capable of “dealing with
ambiguity” and “challenging paradigms.”

7

Large cyber companies like Google and Intel already
operate as quasi-sovereign entities, as the recent
contretemps between Google and China (a severing of
relations, then partial rapprochement) demonstrate.
This is also true, not incidentally, of supra-national
commercial space operators like Intelsat, now
headquartered in Luxembourg.

A former Army captain now at Google was
quoted as saying this: “I think the people who are
doing interesting stuff in the military are
entrepreneurial in mindset. And they don’t look
up for approval and permission to do stuff. They
are just doing it, and then after a while, the chain
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of command recognizes that what they’re doing
has value, and they kind of put a veneer of
respectability around it.” In other words, doctrine
in fast developing environments like counter
insurgency and cyber follows rather than informs
tactics. Confusing that kind of world with the
world of space—or, for that matter, the cyber
challenge with any other we have faced in our
history—is to mire ourselves in false analogy.
There really is something new under the sun.
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